Logan City  v. Lowell D. Carlsen : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
Logan City v. Lowell D. Carlsen : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Lowell D. Carlsen; pro se.
Scott L. Wyatt; attorney for appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Logan v. Carlsen, No. 920739 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/4733




LOWELL D. CARLSEN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 920739-C^j 
Case Type : APPEAlf 
P r i o r i t y No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
AN APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT 
COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF C| 
LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT, THE HONQRABLE[|J 
K. ROGER BEAN, JUDGE PRESIDING 
LOWELL D. CARLSEN 
720 North 400 East 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 752 -flf|| 
Appellant in Pro Se 
SCOTT L. WYATT 
Logan City Prosecutor 
255 North Main 
P.O. Box 527 
Logan, Utah 84323-0527 
Telephone: (801) 750-9807 
Attorney for Plaintiff(s)-Appellee(s) 




LOWELL D. CARLSEN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
SCOTT L. WYATT 
Logan City Prosecutor 
255 North Main 
P.O. Box 527 
Logan, Utah 84323-0527 
Telephone: (801) 750-9807 
Case No. 920739-CA 
Case Type: APPEAL 
Priority No. 2 
LOWELL D. CARLSEN 
720 North 400 East 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 752-6810 
Appellant in Pro Se 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
AN APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT 
COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE 
LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT, THE HONORABLE 
K. ROGER BEAN, JUDGE PRESIDING 
Attorney for Plaintiff(s)-Appellee(s) 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii,iii,iv,v,vi 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 1-5 
DETERMINATIVE.LAWS 5-6 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 6 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 6-8 
C. DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 9 
D. RELEVANT FACTS 9-12 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 12-14 
ARGUMENT 
1 - THE ORDINANCE UNDER WHICH THE DEFENDANT 
WAS CHARGED, SECTION 9.24.040 OF THE RE-
VISED ORDINANCES OF LOGAN CITY VIOLATES 
ARTICLE XI, § 5 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS 14-18 
2 - THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PRO-
SECUTION'S MOTION AMEND THE INFORMATION 
AT TRIAL 19-20 
A. THE ORIGINAL INFORMATION WAS FATALLY 
DEFECTIVE IN THAT IT CHARGED THE DEFENDANT 
FOR VIOLATING AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND 
INVALID ORDINANCE AND COULD NOT BE CURED 
BY MAJOR AMENDMENTS AT TRIAL 20-21 
B. THE PROSECUTION BY THE STATE OF UTAH 
WAS BARRED UNDER THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND 
DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF THE FIFTH AND FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENTS, AND ARTICLE I, § 12 OF 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 21-24 
-i-
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
ARGUMENT 
C. THE LOGAN CITY PROSECUTOR LACKED ANY 
AUTHORITY TO PROSECUTE THE DEFENDANT IN 
THE NAME OF THE STATE OF UTAH 24-28 
D. THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT 
WERE PREJUDICED BY THE AMENDMENTS 28-29 
3 - U.C.A. § 76-10-104 IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
VAGUE 29-38 
4 - THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL WAS INSUF-
FICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE DEFENDANT'S CON-
VICTION . 38-41 
5 - THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO IM-
POSE SENTENCE BECAUSE OF AN UNREASONABLE 
DELAY BETWEEN TRIAL AND SENTENCING 41-44 
CONCLUSION 44 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 44 
ADDENDUM 45 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Allqood v. Larson^ 
545 P.2d 530 (Utah 1976) 7,17,18 
Boyer v. Larson, 
433 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1967) 23 
Bustamante v. People, 
317 P.2d 885 (Colo. 1957) 21 
Cervantes v. People, 
715 P.2d 783 (Colo. 1986) 21 
-xi-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED PAGE 
City of Monticello v. Christensen, 
788 P.2d 513 (Utah 1990) 2 
Christ v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 
57 L.Ed.2d 24, 98 S.Ct. 2156 (1978) 24 
Cochran v. Kansas, 
316 U.S. 255, 86 L.Ed. 1453 (1942) 43 
Doe v. Utah Dept. of Public Safety, 
782 P.2d 489 (Utah 1989) 26 
Faulkner v. Farnsvorth, 
714 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1986) 3, 
Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 
817 P.2d 816 (Utah 1991) 37 
In re Criminal Investigations, 
754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988) 3 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 
61 L.Ed.2d 560, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979) 38 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 
75 L.Ed.2d 1093, 103 S.Ct. 1855 (1983) 31, 
Landry v. Daley, 
280 F.Supp. 968 (D.C. 111. 1968) 34 
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 
96 L.Ed. 288, 72 S.Ct. 240 (1952) 36 
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 
31 L.Ed.2d 110, 92 S.Ct. 839 (1972) 31 
Post v. United States, 161 U.S. 583, 
40 L.Ed. 816, 16 S.Ct. 611 26 
Provo City v. Willden, 
768 P.2d 455 (Utah 1989) 3, 
Richfield City v. Walker, 
790 P.2d 87 (Utah App. 1990) 18 
-iii-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED PAGE 
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 
700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985) 3, 5 
Searle v. Briggs, 
800 P.2d 804 (Utah 1990) 27 
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 
39 L.Ed.2d 605, 94 S.Ct. 1242 (1974) 31,32 
State v. Archambeau, 
820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991) 30 
State v. Blue, 
17 Utah 175, 53 P. 978 (Utah 1898) 36, 41 
State v. Bollander, 
484 P.2d 219 (Ariz. App. 1971) 21 
State v. Brown, 
201 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah 1992) 30 
State v. Couch, 
635 P.2d 89 (Utah 1981) 39 
State v. Durand, 
569 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1977) 28 
State v. Elton, 
680 P.2d 727 (Utah 1984) 36,39,41 
State v. Helm, 
563 P.2d 794 (Utah 1977) 42 
State v. Hodgson, 
722 P.2d 1336 (Wash. App. 1986) 14 
State v. James, 
819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991) 2 
State v. Knoll, 
712 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985) 39 
State v. Merritt, 
67 Utah 325, 247 P. 497 (Utah 1926) 42 
-iv-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED PAGE 
State v. Meyers, 
606 P.2d 250 (Utah 1980) 41 
State v. Nilson, 
214 Utah Adv. Rep. 45 (Utah App. 1993) 23 
State v. Petree, 
659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983) 4, 41 
State v. Pettit/ 
445 N.W.2d 890 (Neb. 1989) 35 
State v. PharriS/ 
204 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah App. 1993) 37 
State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) 5 
State v. Ramon, 
736 P.2d 1059 (Utah App. 1987) 28 
State v. Strand, 
674 P.2d 109 (Utah 1983) 22 
State v. Verde, 
770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989) 4, 41 
State v. Workman, 
806 P.2d 1198 (Utah App. 1991) 3, 41 
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 
84 L.Ed. 1093, 60 S.Ct. 736 31 
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 
98 L.Ed. 989, 74 S.Ct. 808 31 
United States v. National Dairy Products, 372 U.S. 29, 
9 L.Ed.2d 83, 83 S.Ct. 594 (1963) 29 
Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 487, 
25 L.Ed.2d 435, 90 S.Ct. 1198 (1970) 23 
ORDINANCES CITED 
Section 9.24.040, Revised Ordinances, Logan City . . . 5,10,13,16,17 
Section 1.16.010, Revised Ordinances, Logan City . . . 5 , 16 
-v-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTE, RULES PAGE 
U.C.A. § 10-3-928,(Effective Jan. 1, 1992) . . . . 25 
U.C.A. § 32A-12-203, (1953 as amended) 33 
U.C.A. § 76-10-103, (1953 as amended) 33 
U.C.A. § 76-2-101, (1953 as amended) 5, 41 
U.C.A. § 76-2-103, (1953 as amended) 5, 36 
U.C.A. § 76-2-304, (1953 as amended) 39 
U.C.A. § 76-10-104, (1953 as amended) . . . 5,7,13,14-41 
U.C.A. § 77-1-5, (1953 as amended) 5,22,44 
U.C.A. § 77-18a-l, (1953 as amended) 1 
U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(d), (1953 as amended) 1 
U.C.A. § 78-4-11, (1953 as amended) 1 
U.C.A. § 78-7-25, (1953 as amended) 5,43 
Rule 4(d), Utah R. Crim. P 5,28,43 
Rule 22(a), Utah R. Crim. P 5,42 
Rule 23, Utah R. Crim. P 5,42 
Rule 26, Utah R. Crim. P 1 
Article I, § 7, Utah Constitution 29 
Article I, § 12, Utah Constitution 21,22,28 
Article I, § 18, Utah Constitution 25 
Article VIII, § 16, Utah Constitution 27 
Article XI, § 5, Utah Constitution 14,17 
Article I, § 9 & § 10, U.S. Constitution 25 
Fifth Amendment, U.S. Constitution 21,22,23 
Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Constitution . . . . 21-23,29 
-vi-
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LOGAN CITY, ; 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff(s)-Appellee(s), 
-vs-
LOWELL D. CARLSEN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 920739-CA 
Case Type: APPEAL 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a criminal judgment in the 
First Circuit Court, County of Cache, State of Utah, Logan 
City Department pursuant to the provisions of Rule 26 of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and U.C.A. § 77-18a-l, 
(1953 as amended), and jurisdiction is invoked upon this 
Court under the provisions of U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(d) and 
§ 78-4-11, (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the Ordinance under which the defendant 
was charged, Section 9.24.040 of the Revised Ordinances of 
Logan City violates the provisions of Article XI, § 5 of 
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the Utah Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The standards of review to review this issue are as 
follows: Court of Appeals reviews the trial court's decision 
on the constitutionality of the statute for correctness, 
according no deference to its legal conclusions. State v. 
James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991); City of Monticello v. 
Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied, U.S. 
, 111 S.Ct. 120 (1990). 
2. Whether the trial court erred in granting the 
prosecution's motion to amend the Information at trial for 
the following reasons: 
(a). The original Information was fatally defective 
in that it charged the defendant for violating an unconsti-
tutional and invalid Ordinance and could not be cured by 
amendment at trial. 
(b). The prosecution by the State of Utah was barred 
under the Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Con-
stitution and Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
(c). The Logan City Prosecutor lacked any authority 
to prosecute the defendant in the name of the State of Utah. 
(d). The substantial rights of the defendant were 
-2-
prejudiced by the amendments. 
The standards of review to review these issues are 
as follows: To determine nature of trial court's ruling, 
Court of Appeals looks at substance of ruling rather than 
label attached to it by the trial court. State v. Workman, 
806 P.2d 1198, 1202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). On appeal, 
Court of Appeals accords trial court's conclusions of law 
no particular deference, but reviews them for correctness 
and is free to render its independent interpretation. 
Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149, 1150 (Utah 1986); 
and Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
3. Whether the statute under which the defendant was 
convicted, U.C.A. § 76-10-104, (1953 as amended) is unconsti-
tutionally vague in violation of the Due Process Clauses 
under Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution and the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The standards of review to review this issue are as 
follows: Court of Appeals is to construe statutes and 
ordinances so as to carry out legislative intent while 
avoiding constitutional defects. In re Criminal Investigations, 
754 P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988). Court of Appeals will not 
rewrite a statute or ignore its plain language in order to 
reach a constitutional construction. Provo City Corp., v. 
Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1989). 
-3-
4. Whether the evidence adduced at trial was in-
sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction. 
The standards of review to review this issue are 
as follows: In reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the 
evidence, Court of Appeals will review the evidence and all 
inferences which may reasonably drawn from it in the light 
most favorable to the verdict of the jury. Court of Appeals 
will reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence 
only when the evidence so viewed is sufficiently inconclusive 
or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he [or she] was convicted. State v. 
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 (Utah 1989); and State v. Petree, 
659 P.2d 443, 445 (Utah 1983). 
5. Whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction to 
impose sentence because of an unreasonable delay between 
trial and sentencing. 
The standards of review to review this issue are as 
follows: To determine nature of trial court's ruling, Court 
of Appeals looks at substance of ruling rather than label 
attached to it by the trial court. State v. Workman, 806 P.2d 
1198, 1202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). On appeal, Court of Appeals 
accords trial court!s conclusions of law no particular de-
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ference, but reviews them for correctness and is free 
to render its independent interpretation. Faulkner v. 
Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149, 1150 (Utah 1986); and Scharf 
v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1970 (Utah 1985). Court of 
Appeals will review the sufficiency of the trial courtfs 
findings of fact for correctness. State v. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE LAWS 
Section 9.24.040 of the Revised Ordinances of 
Logan City. (See addendum) 
Section 1.16.010 of the Revised Ordinances of 
Logan City. (See addendum) 
U.C.A. § 76-10-104, (1953 as amended). (See addendum) 
U.C.A. § 76-2-101, (1953 as amended). (See addendum) 
U.C.A. § 76-2-102, (1953 as amended). (See addendum) 
U.C.A. § 76-2-303, (1953 as amended). (See addendum) 
U.C.A. § 76-2-304, (1953 as amended). (See addendum) 
U.C.A. § 77-1-5, (1953 as amended). (See addendum) 
U.C.A. § 10-3-928, (1953 as amended). (See addendum) 
U.C.A. § 78-7-25, (1953 as amended). (See addendum) 
Rule 4.(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
(See addendum) 
Rule 22.(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
(See addendum) 
Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
(See addendum) 
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Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution. (See 
addendum). 
Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution. (See 
addendum). 
Article I, § 18 of the Utah Constitution. (See 
addendum). 
Article VIII, § 16 of the Utah Constitution. 
(See addendum). 
Article XI, § 5 of the Utah Constitution. (See 
addendum). 
Article I, § 9 & § 10 of the United States Consti-
tution. (See addendum). 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. (See addendum). 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
(See addendum). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from defendant's criminal con-
viction for the offense of Selling Tobacco Products to a 
person under age nineteen in violation of U.C.A. § 76-10-104, 
(1953 as amended). 
B. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The defendant was tried in a jury trial held in the 
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First Circuit Court of the State of Utah, County of Cache, 
Logan City Department on the 16th day of January, 1992. 
Defense counsel after the jury was impanelled and sworn 
moved the trial court for dismissal of the Information filed 
in the case of Logan City v. Lowell D. Carlsen on grounds 
that the penalty for violating the ordinance under which 
defendant was charged conflicted with the penalty for an 
identical offense under State statute, Allqood v. Larson, 
545 P.2d 530 (Utah 1976). The Logan City Prosecutor, Scott 
L. Wyatt then moved the court to amend the Information chang-
ing the name of the prosecuting party from Logan City to the 
State of Utah, from a charge of violating a municipal ordinance 
to a charge of violating U.C.A. § 76-10-104, (1953 as amended), 
and from a violation of a Class B misdemeanor to a Class C 
misdemeanor. The trial court over defense counsel objections 
granted the prosecutor's motion to amend the Information and 
thereafter instructed the jury as to such amendments (Trial 
Tr. 50-53, 88-93). The trial court took defense counsel's 
motion to dismiss based upon Allqood v. Larson under advise-
ment. The trial court denied defense counsel's motion to 
dismiss at the sentencing held on the 6th day of October, 
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1992. The trial court at sentencing after the jury had 
rendered a guilty verdict in the case of State of Utah 
v. Lowell D. Carlsen, on its own initiative amended the 
Information by changing the name of the prosecuting party 
from the State of Utah to Logan City by denying the pro-
secutor's motion to amend the Information at trial changing 
the name of the prosecuting party (Sentencing Tr. 4). Prior 
to imposing sentence, defense counsel moved the trial court 
for dismissal on grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction 
to impose sentence because of an unreasonable delay between 
trial and sentencing (Sentencing Tr. 9-10). The trial court 
took this matter under advisement and imposed sentence. A 
Notice of Appeal was filed by defense counsel on the 4th 
day of November, 1992. A Memorandum of Decision denying 
defendant's motion raised during sentencing of an unreason-
able delay between trial and sentencing was filed on the 28th 
day of December, 1992. A second Notice of Appeal was filed 
with the Clerk of the trial court by defendant on the 20th 
day of January, 1993 in the case of Logan City, State of 
Utah v. Carlsen. 
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c. 
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
The trial court imposed judgment and sentence on the 
6th day of October, 1992 in the case of Logan City v. 
Lowell D. Carlsen, sentencing the defendant for the offense 
of selling tobacco products to a minor to pay a fine of 
$ 300.00 and serve 30 days in jail at Logan, but placed the 
defendant on six months informal probation. The trial court 
suspended a hundred dollars of the fine and all of the jail 
sentence on the condition that defendant satisfactorily 
completed the probation, (Sentencing Tr. 12). 
D. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
The defendant, Lowell D. Carlsen, owns and operates a 
business in Logan, Utah under the assumed name of Carlsenfs 
Gas for Less which sells gasoline, soda pop, candy, cigarettes, 
and among other things has a self-serve car wash. 
The defendant was issued a citation by Logan City Police 
Officer, J.G. Geier on the 8th day of November, 1991 for the 
offense of selling cigarettes to a minor in violation of U.C.A. 
§ 76-10-104, (R. 117), (Trial Tr. 81-82). 
The defendant was charged by an Information filed in 
the First Circuit Court on the 9th day of December, 1991 for 
the offense of SELLING TOBACCO TO A MINOR (CLASS B MISDEMEANOR), 
(R. 46), at Logan, Utah on 11/8/91 in violation of the following 
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sections of the revised Ordinances of Logan City: 9.24.040. 
That contrary to Logan City Ordinances, Defendant's acts 
constituting the offense(s) were: That the Defendant did 
sell, give or furnish any cigar, cigarettes or tobacco in 
any form to a person under nineteen years of age. Class B 
misdemeanor. 
This Information was signed and authorized for pre-
sentment and filing with the trial court by Jeffrey "R" 
Burbank, Logan City Prosecutor. Mr. Burbank at the time of 
preparing and filing of the Information held two positions. 
Mr. Burbank served as a part time Logan City Prosecutor and 
as a part time Deputy Cache County Attorney for the Cache 
County Attorneyfs Office. 
At trial, the defendant, Lowell D. Carlsen testified 
that he was working at his place of business at approximately 
6:30 PM on the 8th day of November, 1991 when a person approach-
ed the cashier's window and asked for a pack of camel light 
cigarettes. The defendant asked him if he was nineteen and 
the person responded in the affirmative (Trial Tr. 96). The 
defendant then asked him his date of birth and the person gave 
him a date of birth which appeared to be over the age of nine-
teen (Trial Tr. 97). The defendant further testified that the 
person (Jerren Barson) appeared to him to be over the age of 
nineteen (Trial Tr. 96). The defendant thereupon sold him 
-10-
the cigarettes (Trial Tr. 98), 
The defendants testimony was corroborated by the 
statements he made at the time of the incident to Logan 
City Police Officer, J.G. Geier who issued the citation 
to the defendant for the offense of selling cigarettes to 
a minor (Trial Tr. 81-87). 
Jerren Barson testified that he was 16 years old 
and on the night in question he was working as an operative 
for the Logan City Police Department and under the directions 
of Officer Tim Gil Duron (Trial Tr. 5-6). He testified that 
when he approached the cashier's window at Carlsen's Gas 
for Less and asked for a pack of camel light cigarettes 
that the defendant did in fact asked him if he was nineteen 
years of age (Trial Tr. 77). He testified that he did not 
answer the question and defendant sold him the cigarettes 
(Trial Tr. 77). 
Tim Gil Duron testified that he was the Logan City 
Police Officer in charge of the operation on November 8, 1991 
and that Jerren Barson was working under his directions. He 
admitted on cross-examination that on November 8, 1991, he 
was under a criminal investigation being conducted by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation on an alleged police brutality 
complaint filed by defendant's son involving an incident at 
-11-
defendant's place of business on May 19, 1991. 
The undisputed testimony of the defendant at the 
entrapment hearing was that after he was issued the citation, 
Logan City Police Officer, Tim Gil Duron drove past the 
cashier's building in a westerly direction and put he head 
out of the car window and laughed at the defendant real 
loud (Trial Tr. 21-22) . 
During jury deliberations, the jury had a note de-
livered to the trial judge which stated as follows: 
What does the LAW State about I.D. for tobacco sales? 
Does a merchant have to ask for other information? 
Does a merchant need to prove age? 
The trial judge responded with writing on the same 
note and returning it to the jury which stated as follows: 
You have received all the information which you can 
receive on these points. You should proceed to decide 
the case on the evidence & the instructions you have 
received. 
(A copy of this note and request for additional in-
structions was not included in the trial court's records 
and the records on appeal. A true and exact copy of the note 
is included in the addendum to appellant's brief). 
The jury thereafter rendered a verdict of guilty 
against the defendant. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Ordinance under which the defendant was charged, 
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Section 9.24.040 of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City 
violates the provisions of Article XI, § 5 of the Utah 
Constitution because the penalty conflicts with the 
general laws of the State and deprived defendant of Equal 
Protection of Law as secured under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. 
2. The trial court erred in granting the prosecution's 
motion to amend the Information at trial because: 
(a) The original Information was fatally defective 
in that it charged the defendant for violating an unconsti-
tutional and invalid Ordinance and could not be cured by 
major amendments at trial. 
(b) The prosecution by the State of Utah was barred 
under the Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Con-
stitution and Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
(c) The Logan City Prosecutor lacked any authority 
to prosecute the defendant in the name of the State of Utah. 
(d) The substantial rights of the defendant were 
prejudiced by the major amendments. 
3. The statute under which the defendant was convicted, 
U.C.A. § 76-10-104, (1953 as amended) is unconstitutionally 
vague, both facially and as applied in violation of the 
Due Process Clauses under Article I, § 7 of the Utah Con-
stitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
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4. The evidence adduced at trial was insufficient 
to sustain the defendant's conviction. 
5. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose 
sentence because of an unreasonable delay of over 8 months 
between trial and sentencing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ORDINANCE UNDER WHICH THE DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED, 
SECTION 9.24.040 OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF LOGAN 
CITY VIOLATES ARTICLE XI, § 5 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS. 
Defense counsel after the jury was impanelled and sworn, 
moved the trial court for dismissal of the Information because 
the penalty for violating Section 9.24.040 of the Revised 
Ordinances of Logan City was in conflict with the penalty 
for a violation of an identical offense under U.C.A. 
§ 76-10-104, (1953 as amended), (Trial Tr. 48-50). The trial 
court at the sentencing hearing denied defense counsel's 
motion (Sentencing Tr. 4-7). 
The Washington Court of Appeals in the case of State 
v. Hodgson, 722 P.2d 1336 at 1340 (Wash Ct.App. 1986) held 
that prosecutorial discretion to seek varying degrees of 
punishments from proving identical elements of a crime violates 
the Equal Protection Clause. 
The prosecutor in the instant case, Jeffrey "R" 
Burbank who prepared, authorized, presented, signed and filed 
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the Information with the trial court had the discretion 
to seek varying degrees of punishment against the defendant 
by proving identical elements of a criminal offense. 
As pointed out earlier in the Statement of the Case, 
Mr. Burbank serves two part time positions one as a Logan 
City Prosecutor and the other as a Deputy Cache County 
Attorney. As a Deputy Cache County Attorney, Mr. Burbank 
had the discretion to file an Information as per the citation 
issued to defendant for the offense of selling tobacco 
products to a minor in violation of U.C.A. § 76-10-104, a 
class C misdemeanor. As a Logan City Prosecutor, Mr. 
Burbank had the discretion to and did file an Information 
for the identical offense of selling tobacco products to 
a minor in violation of Section 9.24.040 of the Revised 
Ordinances of Logan City, a class B misdemeanor. 
The pertinent part of U.C.A. § 76-10-104, provides 
as follows: 
Any person who sells, gives or furnishes any cigar, 
cigarette, or tobacco in any form, to any person 
under 19 years of age, is guilty of a class C 
misdemeanor on the first offense, a class B mis-
demeanor on the second offense, and a class A 
misdemeanor on subsequent offenses. 
The pertinent part of Section 9.24.040 of the 
Revised Ordinances of Logan City provides as follows: 
It is unlawful for any person to sell, give or 
-15-
furnish any cigar, cigarette or tobacco in any 
form to any person under nineteen years of age. 
Section 9.24.040 of the Revised Ordinances of 
Logan City does not provide for any penalty. The penalty 
for violating Section 9.24.040 is under an omnibus clause, 
Section 1.16.010 of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City 
which provides as follows: 
All violations of this municipal code of which no 
lesser penalties are provided, are classified as 
class B misdemeanors, punishable by a fine not to 
exceed the sum of one thousand dollars, or by 
imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed six 
months or by both such fine and imprisonment. 
Defense counsel pointed out to the trial court that 
the Information itself was defective because it failed to 
charge the defendant with a second violation for selling 
tobacco products to a minor (Trial Tr. 49). When defense 
counsel moved the Court for dismissal of the Information, the 
prosecutor moved to amend the Information to charge the de-
fendant for violating U.C.A. § 76-10-104, a class C mis-
demeanor (Trial Tr. 52-53). 
It would certainly be a grave injustice to allow a 
prosecutor the discretion to seek and obtain a class B mis-
demeanor conviction for the first offense of selling tobacco 
products to a minor under a municipal ordinance and once 
having obtained a class B conviction, to seek and obtain a 
class A misdemeanor conviction for a second offense under 
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a state statute, U.C.A. § 76-10-104, thus circumventing 
legislative intent that the first offense be a class C 
misdemeanor, a second offense be a class B misdemeanor, 
and any subsequent offense be a class A misdemeanor. 
The prosecutor filing an Information charging the 
defendant for the offense of selling tobacco products to a 
minor in violation of Section 9.24.040 of the Revised Ordinaces 
of Logan City, a class B misdemeanor violated the defendant's 
rights to Equal Protection of the Laws. 
The defendant further contends that Section 9.24.040 
of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City violates the pro-
visions of Article XI, § 5 of the Utah Constitution. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Allqood v. Larson, 545 P.2d 
530 at 532 (Utah 1976) held that: If the ordinace penalty 
conflicts with that of the general law of the state covering 
the same subject, the ordinance penalty is void. The charter 
or ordinance penalty cannot exceed that of the state law. 
The ordinance penalty in the instant case for violating 
Section 9.24.040 of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City is a 
class B misdemeanor. This penalty exceeds that which the 
defendant could be charged for an identical offense under a 
statute, U.C.A. § 76-10-104 of a class C misdemeanor. 
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Justice Crockett in his dissenting opinion in 
Allqood, 545 P.2d 530 at 533, stated as follows: 
Further, without conceding, or intimating, any 
view on my part that the ordinance should be 
declared unconstitutional, I also observe that I 
can see no justification whatever for declaring 
the whole ordinance invalid. Nothing about it 
could possibly be invalid except only the jail 
sentence part, which can be regarded as severable. 
There is a clear distinction in the instant case 
and this Courtfs more recent decision in Richfield City 
v. Walker, 790 P. 2d 8-7 at 90 (Utah App. 1990) where this 
Court held that the challenged ordinance in that case did 
not conflict with the state statute because both the ordinance 
and the statute described class B misdemeanors. 
The instant case differs because the ordinance de-
scribes a class B misdemeanor and the state statute of an 
identical offense describes a class C misdemeanor for the 
first offense. 
The ordinance under which the defendant was charged, 
Section 9.24.040 of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City 
conflicts with the provisions of Article XI, § 5 of the 
Utah Constitution and the trial court erred in denying the 
defendants motion to dismiss the Information. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PROSECUTION'S 
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MOTION TO AMEND THE INFORMATION AT TRIAL. 
The Logan City Prosecutor, Scott L. Wyatt at trial 
and after the jury was impanelled and sworn moved the 
trial court to amend the Information (Trial Tr. 50-52). 
Pointing out at page 90 of the Trial Transcript, the 
proceedings went as follows: 
Mr. HULT: That sounds fine, your Honor. The only 
thing I want to do because I'm uncertain as to whether I 
did previously, is to place on the record our objection to 
the motion to amend. I think we discussed it, but I'm not 
sure if I stated outright that we object— 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. HULT: --to the motion to amend. 
THE COURT: All right. The record will show you ob-
jection, and I've treated that as if it had been stated. 




No. I think that everything's been said, 
THE COURT: All right. The Court now grants the 
prosecution's motion to amend, to substitute the State of 
Utah in place of Logan City as the prosecuting agency, and 
grants the motion to amend to refer to the State statute as 
the governing legal provision, specifically Section—can't 
find it here. Thank you. 76-10-104 of the Utah Code, and 
grants the motion to identify it as a Class C misdemeanor. 
And the Court does that, as I say, for the purpose 
of getting the issue to the jury in the proper form, at 
least tentatively, and then if that's—if that's not correct, 
a later decision by the Court will remedy that. It it--if 
it can be done, and ti's correct, we won't have wasted the 
jury's time and the witnesses' and counsel's and everyone's 
time. So, I think that's the best way to proceed, and the 
Court grants that motion. 
The court continues and keeps under advisement de-
fendant's motion, however, to dismiss, because of the con-
flict between the ordinance and the State statute. 
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Pointing out at page 109 of the Trial Transcript, 
the trial court thereafter instructed the jury as 
follows: 
THE COURT: There are a couple of things we've 
done. We've amended the pleadings to show State of Utah 
as the plaintiff. We won't explain to you all of the 
reasons for this. It shows State of Utah as the plaintiff 
in the action rather than Logan City. Mr. Wyatt's role 
here is as a representative of the State of Utah, and 
that's permitted under the statute at this present time. 
Another change is that the offense is a Class C 
misdemeanor, and you'll be instructed in these instructions 
to that effect rather than a Class B misdemeanor. I think 
preliminarily that's all that I need to tell you. 
The jury after deliberations, returned a verdict 
of guilty in the case of the State of Utah v. Lowell D. 
Carlsen (R. 55). 
The defendant contends that the trial court erred 
in granting the prosecution's motion to amend the Infor-
mation for the following reasons: 
A. 
THE ORIGINAL INFORMATION WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE IN 
THAT IT CHARGED THE DEFENDANT FOR VIOLATING AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID ORDINANCE AND COULD 
NOT BE CURED BY MAJOR AMENDMENTS AT TRIAL. 
The defendant contends that the original Information 
filed in this case was fatally defective in that it charged 
him for violating an unconstitutional and invalid ordinance 
as per defendant's argument under Point I herein and could 
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not be cured by amendment at trial. This contention is 
consistent with the holdings of the Arizona Court of 
Appeals in State V. Bollander, 484 P.2d 219-220 (Ariz. 
App. 1971). 
The defendant further contends that the original 
Information filed in this case could not be cured by 
amendment at trial because of the major amendments of 
changing the name of the plaintiff and prosecuting party 
from Logan City to the State of Utah; from charging the 
defendant for violating Section 9.24.040 of the Revised 
Ordinance of Logan City to charging defendant with violat-
ing U.C.A. § 76-10-104; and from a class B misdemeanor to 
a class C misdemeanor. 
This contention is consistent with the holdings 
of the Colorado Supreme Court in Cervantes v. State, 
715 P.2d 783 at 786 (Colo. 1986) where that Court in citing 
Bustamante v. People, 317 P.2d 885,887 (1957) held that the 
sufficiency of an information is a matter of jurisdiction, 
so any conviction based on an information requiring major 
amendment is void. 
B. 
THE PROSECUTION BY THE STATE OF UTAH WAS BARRED 
UNDER THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND DUE PROCESS CLAUSES 
OF THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS, AND 
ARTICLE I, § 12 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
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The defendant contends that the prosecution in 
the name of the State of Utah was barred by the Double 
Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
The pertinent part of U.C.A. § 77-1-5, (1953 as 
amended) provides as follows: 
A criminal action for any violation of a state 
statute shall be prosecuted in the name of the 
State of Utah. A criminal action for violation 
of any county or municipal ordinance shall be 
prosecuted in the name of the governmental entity 
involved. 
Pointing out at page 91-92 of the Trial Transcript, 
the proceedings went as follows: 
THE COURT: I'm not sure but what the motion of 
the defendant is well taken, that you have a conflict 
here between the City ordinance and the State statute 
and it's too late to cure it. I think that's what Mr. 
Hult's position is; that the jury's been sworn and 
defendant's in jeopardy, and I think what he's saying is, 
if that's a bad approach to the prosecution, then it can't 
be brought again. I suppose that would be your argument. 
MR. HULT: Yes, if there was a refiling, but more 
particularly, at this point in time, that that one statute 
giving them authority to prosecute State statutes doesn't 
apply to something that occurred before January 1st, in 
addition to the prejudice that the defendant's suffering 
at this late stage of the proceedings. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Strand, 674 P.2d 
109 at 114 (Utah 1983) held that a criminal Information 
could not be amended if the amendment places the defendant 
twice in jeopardy. 
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The United States Supreme Court in Waller v. 
Florida/ 397 U.S. 487, 25 L.Ed.2d 435, 90 S.Ct. 1184 
(1970) held that a prosecution by a municipal government 
for violating a municipal ordinance bars a subsequent 
prosecution by a State government for an identical offense 
under a State statute under the Double Jeopardy and Due 
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution. 
The question then in the instant case is whether 
the defendant was sufficiently placed in jeopardy in the 
prosecution by Logan City, a municipal government for 
violating a municipal ordinance of selling tobacco products 
to a minor in violation of Section 9.24.040 of the Revised 
Ordinances of Logan City to bar prosecution by the State of 
Utah for an identical offense of selling tobacco products 
to a minor in violation of a State statute, U.C.A. § 76-10-
104, (1953 as amended). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Boyer v. Larson, 433 P.2d 
1015 at 1016 (Utah 1967) held that jeopardy attaches to a 
defendant in a jury trial when the jury is impaneled and 
sworn. This Court in the more recent decision in State v. 
Nilson, 214 Utah Adv. Rep. 45 at 47 (Utah App. 1993) held 
that jeopardy attaches to a defendant in a jury trial when 
the jury is impaneled and sworn. The United States Supreme 
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Court in Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 57 L.Ed.2d 24, 
98 S.Ct. 2156 (1978) held that under the Double Jeopardy 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the States 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
that jeopardy attaches to a defendant in a jury trial 
when the jury is impaneled and sworn. 
The trial court granted the prosecution's motion to 
amend the information after the jury was impaneled and sworn, 
and the prosecutor had presented his case in chief in the 
case of Logan City v. Lowell D. Carlsen for the offense of 
selling tobacco products to a minor in violation of Section 
9.24.040 of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City. The amend-
ments to the Information authorizing the State of Utah to 
prosecute the defendant for the identical offense of selling 
tobacco products to a minor in violation of U.C.A. § 76-10-
104 was barred by the Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution. The verdict rendered by the jury in the case 
of the State of Utah v. Lowell D. Carlsen should therefore 
be declared null and void by this Honorable Court. 
C. 
THE LOGAN CITY PROSECUTOR LACKED ANY AUTHORITY TO 
PROSECUTE THE DEFENDANT IN THE NAME OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH. 
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The defendant contends that Logan City Prosecutor, 
Scott L. Wyatt lacked any authority to prosecute him in 
the name of the State of Utah for two reasons. First, 
is that the statute authorizing city attorneys and 
prosecutor's to prosecute criminal offenses in the name 
of the State of Utah, U.C.A. § 10-3-928 (Effective 
January 1, 1992) is ex post facto legislation. Second, 
U.C.A. § 10-3-928, (Effective January 1, 1992) is in conflict 
with the provisions of Article VIII, § 16 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
The city prosecutor in this case claimed authority 
to represent the State of Utah and charge the defendant 
with violating a state statute under an amendment to U.C.A. 
§ 10-3-928 which became effective January 1, 1992. Trial 
was held in this case on January 16, 1992 but the alleged 
offense occurred on November 8, 1991 and the original 
Information was filed with the trial court on December 8, 
1991. 
Permitting the city prosecutor to prosecute violations 
of state statutes which occurred prior to this grant of 
authority constitutes a violation of defendant's rights 
against ex post facto laws under Article I, § 9 & § 10 of 
the United States Constitution and Article I, § 18 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
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While it is discretionary with the legislature 
when granting, limiting, or redistributing jurisdiction 
in criminal cases, to include past offenses, Post v. United 
States, 161 U.S. 583, 40 L.Ed. 816, 16 S.Ct. 611, no such 
grant of authority has been made by the legislature in 
this case. There is no relaxation of the ex post facto 
prohibition even in the area of changes of jurisdiction of 
the prosecuting authority unless specifically granted. The 
new authority of the city prosecutor to prosecute state 
offenses in the name of the State of Utah can only apply to 
offenses committed within the municipal boundaries on or 
after January 1, 1992. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Footnote 1 in Doe v. 
Utah Dept. of Public Safety, 782 P.2d 489 at 490 (Utah 1989) 
stated as follows: 
Both Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-2 and § 67-15-10.5 were 
amended subsequent to the initiation of this action. 
The later amendments have no application in this case, 
and we do not assess their legal force or effect.See 
generally Utah Const, art. I, § 18; U.S. Const, art. 
I, §§ 9, 10 (ex post facto law constitutional pro-
hibitions) . 
Logan City Prosecutor, Scott L. Wyatt had no authority 
to prosecute the defendant in the name of the State of Utah 
when this action was initiated by the filing of the Information 
on December 8, 1991 (R. 46). 
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The Utah Constitution requires that prosecutions 
for criminal actions in the name of the State of Utah be 
by elected public prosecutors. Thus, the prosecution of 
the defendant in this case under a State statute in the 
name of the State of Utah by a city attorney, an appointed 
official, violates the provisions of Article VIII, § 16 
of the Utah Constitution which provides as follows: 
The Legislature shall provide for a system of public 
prosecutors who shall have primary responsibilities 
for the prosecution of criminal actions brought in 
the name of the State of Utah and shall perform 
such other duties as may be provided by statute. 
Public prosecutors shall be elected in a manner 
provided by statute, and shall be admitted to 
practice law in Utah. If a public prosecutor 
fails or refuses to prosecute, the Supreme Court 
shall have power to appoint a prosecutor pro 
tempore. 
It is clear from this provision that the public 
prosecutors given responsibility for bringing criminal 
actions in the name of the State of Utah are to be elected 
officials, not appointed officials. See, Footnote 2 in 
Searle v. Briqqs, 800 P.2d 804, 806 (Utah 1990). There 
is no statutory provision in Utah providing for the elections 
of city attorneys. Rather, they are appointed. U.C.A. § 
10-3-809 and § 10-3-902, (1953 as amended). Also, as 
demonstrated under the argument of Point I of this Brief, 
U.C.A. § 10-3-928 gives city attorneys the discretion to 
seek varying degrees of punishment by proving identical 
elements of a crime and the discretion to prosecute under 
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a municipal ordinance or a State statute for an identical 
offense but different penalties violates Equal Protection 
of the Laws. Hence, the amendments to prosecute the defendant 
in the name of the State of Utah under a State statute by 
the Logan City Prosecutor was invalid. 
D. 
THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT WERE 
PREJUDICED BY THE AMENDMENTS. 
The pertinent part of Rule 4{d) of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure provides as follows: 
The court may permit an indictment or information 
to be amended at any time before verdict if no 
additional or different offense is charged and the 
substantial rights of the defendant are not pre-
judiced. After verdict, an indictment or infor-
mation may be amended so as to state the offense 
with such particularity as to bar a subsequent 
prosecution for the same offense upon the same 
set of facts. 
The defendant contends that his substantial rights 
were prejudiced by the amendments in the instant case. 
State v. Ramon, 736 P.2d 1059 (Utah App. 1987), cert, denied 
765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988). 
First, the substantial rights of the defendant not to 
be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense were pre-
judiced by the amendments. Secondly, the defendant's right 
to trial by a fair and impartial jury secured under Article I, 
§ 12, Utah Constitution were prejudiced. State v. Durand, 569 
P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1977). The jury in this case may 
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have been mislead and improperly influenced by the 
numerous and major amendments to the Information. The 
amendments may have created the false impression in the 
minds of the jurors that defendant may have committed or 
was charged with numerous offenses, both against the State 
of Utah and Logan City. The amendments to the Information 
in this case after the original information was read to 
the jury, deprived defendant of his rights to a fair and 
impartial jury trial. Third, the lack of any prior notice 
that the defendant would be prosecuted for violating U.C.A. 
§ 76-10-104, deprived the defendant of the opportunity to 
challenge in the trial court, the constitutionality of the 
statute as per the argument of the defendant under Point III 
of this Brief. 
POINT III 
U.C.A. § 76-10-104 IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE. 
The defendant contends that the statute under which 
he was convicted, U.C.A. § 76-10-104, (1953 as amended) is 
unconstitutionally vague, both facially and as applied in 
this case in violation of the Due Process Clauses under 
Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. United States 
v. National Dairy Products, 372 U.S. 29, 9 L.Ed2d 83, 83 
S.Ct. 594 (1963). 
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The defendant submits that this issue was not 
raised before the trial court. Defendant contends that 
because of the plain error and exceptional circumstances 
involved in this case that the issue may be raised for 
the first time on appeal. State v. Brown, 201 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 4,5 (Utah 1992); and State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 
920, 922 (Utah App. 1991). The exceptional circumstances 
in this case being that defendant was not given adequate 
notice that he would be prosecuted under the statute and 
the validity of the ordinance under which he was originally 
charged was challenged on other grounds. Defense counsel 
objected to the amendment to the Information and to the 
prosecution under U.C.A. § 76-10-104 (Trial Tr. 90). 
There was plain error because the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court that it was committing error, and 
the error in this case affected the substantial rights of 
the defendant. 
The defendant was convicted for violating the pro-
visions of U.C.A. § 76-10-104, which provides as follows: 
Any person who sells, gives or furnishes any cigar, 
cigarette, or tobacco in any form, to any person 
under 19 years of age, is guilty of a class C mis-
demeanor on the first offense, a class B misdemeanor 
on the second offense, and a class A misdemeanor on 
subsequent offenses. 
U.C.A. § 76-10-104 is unconstitutionally vague not 
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only in the sense that it "fails to give a person of or-
dinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated 
conduct is forbidden by the statute," United State v. 
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 98 L.Ed. 989, 74 S.Ct. 808; but 
lacks any ascertainable standards of guilt, Papachristou 
v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 165-166, 31 L.Ed. 
2d 110, 117-118, 92 S.Ct. 839 (1972); but also fails to 
establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement, 
Smith v. Goquen, 415 U.S. 566, 39 L.Ed.2d 605, 94 S.Ct. 
1242 (1974); and the statute's vagueness encourages ar-
bitrary and erratic arrests and convictions, Thornhill v. 
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 84 L.Ed. 1093, 60 S.Ct. 736. 
The United States Supreme Court in Kolender v. 
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-358, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 909, 103 
S.Ct. 1855 (1983) stated as follows: 
As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine 
requires that a penal statute define the criminal 
offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary 
people can understand what conduct is prohibited 
and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement. - - - - -[citation omitted] 
Although the doctrine focuses both on actual notice 
to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have re-
cognized recently that the more important aspect of 
the vagueness doctrine "is not actual notice, but 
the other principal element of the doctrine—the 
requirement that a legislature establish minimal 
guildelines to govern law enforcement." Smith, 415 
U.S. at 574, 39 L.Ed.2d 605, 94 S.Ct. 1242. Where 
the legislature fails to provide such minimal guide-
lines, a criminal statute may permit "a standardless 
sweep [that] allows policeman, prosecutors, and juries 
to pursue their personal predilections." Id., at 575, 
39 L.Ed.2d 605, 94 S.Ct. 1242. 
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The Utah Legislature in enacting the provisions of 
U.C.A. § 76-10-104, failed to establish such minimal guide-
lines to govern law enforcement as required under Smith 
and Kolender, thus allowing the police, prosecutors and 
juries to pursue their own personal predilections. This 
can be demonstrated in the instant case by the issues and 
questions of law raised by the jury during their deliberation. 
During jury deliberations, the jury had a note de-
livered to the trial judge which stated as follows: 
What does the LAW State about I.D. for tobacco sales? 
Does a merchant have to ask for other information? 
Does a merchant need to prove age? 
The trial judge responded with writing on the same 
note and returning it to the jury which stated as follows: 
You have received all the information which you can 
receive on these points. You should proceed to de-
cide the case on the evidence and the instructions 
you have received. 
The lack of such minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement required the jury in the instant case to pursue 
their own personal predilections. 
This can further be demonstrated by comparing U.C.A. 
§ 76-10-104 with other statutes involving businesses and 
minors. For example, U.C.A. § 76-10-103, (1953 as amended) 
which provides as follows: 
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It is a class C misdemeanor for the proprietor of 
any place of business to knowingly permit persons 
under age nineteen to frequent a place of business 
while they are using tobacco. 
The prosecution under the provisions of § 76-10-103 
has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the proprietor of a business knowingly permitted persons 
under age nineteen to frequent the business while they are 
using tobacco. 
An identical situation exists involving sales of 
alcoholic beverages to minors, U.C.A. § 32A-12-203(b), 
(1953 as amended). The prosecution has the burden of prov-
ing beyond a reasonable doubt that a person knowingly sold 
or furnished alcoholic beverages to a person under the age 
of 21. 
What is lacking in the challenged statute in the in-
stant case, § 76-10-104 is the requirement for the prose-
cution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a person 
knowingly sold or furnished tobacco products to a person 
under the age of nineteen. The prosecution need only to 
prove that a person sold or furnished cigarettes to a person 
who happens or turns out to be under the age of nineteen. 
The prosecution has no burden to prove any mens rea, knowledge 
or criminal intent. A merchant or cashier who sells cigarettes 
to a person who appears to be nineteen and furnishes the 
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merchant or cashier with false Identification which appears 
to be valid and showing their age to be nineteen could be 
arrested, prosecuted and conviction under the provisions 
of U.C.A. § 76-10-104. Or the application of § 76-10-104 
to the facts of the instant case. 
The defendant testified at trial that when he sold 
the cigarettes to Jerren Barson on November 8, 1991, Jerren 
Barson appeared to him to be of the age between 20 and 22. 
(Trial Tr. 96). The defendant further testified that he 
asked Jerren Barson if he was nineteen and Jerren Barson 
responded in the affirmative. (Trial Tr. 96). The defendant 
then asked Jerren Barson his date of birth and Jerren Barson 
responded by stating December, 71. (Trial Tr. 97). The 
defendant's testimony is corroborated by the statements 
he made at the time of the incident to Logan City Police 
Officer, J.G. Geier. (Trial Tr. 81-87). 
The Federal Courts have held that Due Process re-
quires that knowledge and intent be essential elements of 
a crime. Landry v. Daley, 280 F.Supp. 968 (D.C. 111. 1968). 
The Nebraska Court has held that elimination of 
criminal intent as element necessary for violation of a 
statute may violate due process when penalty for violation 
of statute is severe or conviction for violation of statute 
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may irreparably damage the defendant's reputation. 
State v. Pettit, 445 N.W.2d 890 (Neb. 1989). 
A conviction for violating U.C.A. § 76-10-104 
which can ultimately result in a class A misdemeanor 
conviction, punishable by a year imprisonment and a fine 
of $ 2,500.00 is a severe penalty requiring the inclusion 
of knowledge or criminal intent as a necessary element 
of the offense. 
The trial court instructed the jury in this case 
under Instruction No. 6 as follows: 
Before you may find the defendant guilty of the crime 
of Selling Tobacco to a Minor, you must find from the 
evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the follow-
ing elements of that crime, to-wit: 
1. That the defendant did sell tobacco to another 
person. 
2. That the other such person was under the age of 
19 years. 
3. That the act did take place on or about November 
8, 1991. 
4. That the act did take place in Logan City, Cache 
County, State of Utah. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and 
all of the essential elements of the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it is your duty to convict the de-
fendant of this offense. On the other hand, if the 
evidence has failed to so establish one or more of 
the said elements, then you should find the defendant 
not guilty of this offense. 
Clearly, by this Instruction, defendant was not con-
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victed by the jury of knowingly selling tobacco to a 
person under the age of nineteen. Instruction No. 7 
given to the jury by the trial court merely gives the 
legal definition of knowledge and criminal intent as 
defined under the provisons of U.C.A. § 76-2-103, 
(1953 as amended), and the instruction does not state 
that such knowledge or criminal intent was an essential 
element of the offense in order to convict. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Blue, 17 Utah 
175, 53 P. 978 (Utah 1898) held that a public officer 
was not punishable for an act committed innocently with-
out criminal intent, where statute, with no reference to 
mental state, made private appropriation of public money 
a felony. 
U.C.A. § 76-10-104 should not be construed to be 
a strict liability statute because it does not clearly 
indicate a legislative purpose to impose criminal respon-
sibility for commission of the conduct prohibited by the 
statute without requiring proof of any culpable mental 
state. State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 727 (Utah 1984); and 
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 96 L.Ed. 288, 
72 S.Ct. 240 (1952). 
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The United States Supreme Court under Footnote 7 
in Kolender, 461 U.S. 352, 358, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 909 
stated as follows: 
Our concern for minimal guidelines finds its roots 
as far back as our decision in United States v. 
Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221, 25 L.Ed. 563 (1876): 
"It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature 
could set a net large enough to catch all possible 
offenders, and leave it to the courts to step in-
side and say who could be rightfully detained, and 
who should be set at large. This would, to some 
extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative 
department of government." 
U.C.A. § 76-10-104 is incapable of any valid 
application because of the lack of knowledge or criminal 
intent being essential elements of the offense and is 
therefore facially invalid. Greenwood v. City of North Salt 
Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991); and State v. Pharris, 
204 Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 45 (Utah App. 1993). Furthermore, 
§ 76-10-104 is invalid as applied to the facts of this 
case both in the sense of the lack of fair notice but also 
the lack of minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement in 
violation of the Due Process Clauses under Article I, § 7 
of the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the Courts will 
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not rewrite a statute or ignore its plain language in 
order to reach a constitutional construction. Provo City 
Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1989). 
U.C.A. § 76-10-104 lacks minimal guidelines to 
govern law enforcement because of the lack of any standards 
relating to Identification requirements for merchants in 
the business of selling tobacco products, thus allowing the 
police, prosecutors and juries to pursue their own personal 
predilections as to such Identification requirements. The 
jury's request in the instant case for additional instructions 
shows that four persons of ordinary intelligence could not 
reasonably understand the conduct proscribed under the pro-
visions of U.CoA. § 76-10-104. This Court should therefore 
declare the provisions of U.C.A. § 76-10-104 to be unconsti-
tutionally vague and reverse the conviction of the defendant. 
POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUSTAIN THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION. 
It is the defendant's contention that the evidence 
adduced at trial was insufficient to sustain the conviction. 
The United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 
443 U.S. 307, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979) held 
that a criminal conviction violates the Due Process Clause 
when viewing the evidence as a whole in the light most 
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favorable to the prosecution/ no rational trier of fact 
could have found the defendant guilty of each and every 
essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Knoll, 712 
P.2d 211 at 214 (Utah 1985) stated as follows: 
This Court has in numerous cases stated that in 
presenting defenses in criminal cases a defendant 
does not bear the burden of persuasion. It is 
sufficient for acquittal that the evidence or lack 
thereof creates a reasonable doubt as to any element 
of the crime. State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Utah 
1977); State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744 (Utah 1975); 
and State v. Jackson, 528 P.2d 145 (Utah 1974). 
The ultimate burden of proving the defendant's 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt remains on the 
state, whether defendant offers any evidence in 
an effort to prove affirmative defenses or not. 
State v. Curtis, supra. 
Defense counsel in the instant case submitted a 
written request and proposed instruction with the trial court 
requesting the Court to instruct the jury on Mistake of 
Fact as defined under the provisions of U.C.A. § 76-2-304, 
(1953 as amended). (R. 52-54). The trial court decline to 
give the jury the requested instruction (R. 53). When the 
jury requested the trial court for additional instructions 
on identification requirements on tobacco sales, the trial 
court failed to give the jury the requested instruction. 
State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89 (Utah 1981). 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 
727, 731 (Utah 1984) held that mistake of fact as to the age 
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of an alleged victim is a defense to a criminal prose-
cution. 
The evidence adduced at trial in the instant case shows 
a clear mistake of fact as to the age of Jerren Barson. The 
defendant testified at trial that when he sold the cigarettes 
to Jerren Barson on November 8, 1991, Jerren Barson appeared 
to him to be of the age between 20 and 22. (Trial Tr. 96). 
The defendant further testified that he asked Jerren Barson 
if he was nineteen and Jerren Barson responded in the affirm-
ative. (Trial Tr. 96). The defendant further testified that 
he then asked Jerren Barson his date of birth, and Jerren 
Barson without batting an eye responded by stating December, 
71. (Trial Tr. 97). The defendant's testimony is corroborated 
by the statements he made at the time of the incident to 
Logan City Police Officer, J.G. Geier. (Trial Tr. 81-87). 
Jerren Barson testified that the defendant did in 
fact asked him if he was 19 years of age. (Trial Tr. 77). He 
further testified that defendant proceeded to sell the cigar-
ettes to him without waiting for an answer or reponse (Trial 
Tr. 77). This testimony of Jerren Barson suggests that the 
defendant acts differently than any other merchant or cashier 
in the retail business. For example, will this be cash or 
charge? Is it the norm for a cashier to sell an item or pro-
duct without waiting for a response from the customer? This 
testimony of Jerren Barson is so inherently improbable, that 
-40-
no reasonable minds could believe it. State v. Meyers, 
606 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1980); State v. Workman, 806 P.2d 
1198, 1204 (Utah App. 1991), affirmed P.2d 
(Utah 1993) . 
The prosecution in the instant case failed to 
establish and prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant had a culpable mental state or a criminal state 
of mind as required under U.C.A. § 76-2-101, (1953 as 
amended); State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 727, 728 (Utah 1984); 
and State v. Blue, 17 Utah 175, 53 P. 978, 980 (Utah 1898), 
to sell cigarettes to a person under the age of nineteen in 
violation of U.C.A. § 76-10-104. The evidence adduced at 
trial was sufficiently inconclusive as to justify and 
warrant the reversal of the defendant's conviction by 
this Court. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983); 
and State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989). 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO IMPOSE 
SENTENCE BECAUSE OF AN UNREASONABLE DELAY 
BETWEEN TRIAL AND SENTENCING. 
The defendant next contends that the trial court 
lacked jurisdiction to impose sentence because of an un-
reasonable delay between trial and sentencing. 
Defense counsel at the sentencing hearing held on 
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October 6, 1992, moved for dismissal on grounds of the de-
lay between trial and sentencing. (Sentencing Tr. 9). The 
defendant submits that this was a jurisdictional question 
and actually a motion in arrest of judgment under Rule 23 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. State v. Merritt, 
67 Utah 325, 247 P. 497 (Utah 1926). The trial court took 
the matter under advisement and denied the motion in a 
Memorandum of Decision filed on December 28, 1992 (R. 72). 
A second Notice of Appeal was filed by defendant from this 
decision. (R. 82). 
The defendant without being advised of his right to 
be sentenced not less than two nor more than 30 days as pro-
vided under Rule 22(a) URCrimP, agreed to be sentenced in a 
five or six week period or the end of February, 1992. (Trial 
Tr. 112-113). The postponement of sentencing was to allow 
the trial judge to take under advisement, defendant's motion 
to dismiss raised at trial and the trial court agreed to issue 
a memorandum decision on the motion within said period of 
time. (Trial Tr. 113). No written memorandum decision was 
issued by the trial court and defendant was not sentenced 
until October 6, 1992. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 
794 (Utah 1977) held that the time limits are directory, not 
mandatory, and trial court's failure to comply with them does 
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not divest it of jurisdiction to pass sentence; where 
sentence is imposed within reasonable time so that the delay 
does not amount to an abuse of the court's powers or ad-
versely affect the defendant. 
The failure of the trial court to pass sentence in 
the instant case was a clear abuse of the courtfs power 
because of the trial court's failure to render a decision 
and issue a written memorandum as to the issue under ad-
visement within the 60 day period as required under U.C.A. 
78-7-25 (1988 Amendment). 
Furthermore, the defendant was adversely affected by 
the delay because of the frustration of his right to appeal 
the verdict of jury and his conviction. Cochran v. Kansas, 
316 U.S. 255, 86 L.Ed. 1453 (1942). The defendant in the 
instant case stood convicted by a jury for a period of over 
eight months prior to imposition of sentence to allow him 
to appeal his conviction. 
Clearly, defendant's consent to be sentence within a 
five or six week period should not be construed to be a 
waiver for a period of over eight months. 
Furthermore, the trial court's amendment of the In-
formation at sentencing by changing the name of the prose-
cuting party after verdict from the State of Utah to Logan 
City violated Rule 4(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Pro-
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cedures and U.C.A. § 77-1-5, (1953 as amended). 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant-appellant respectfully submits that 
based upon the foregoing, his conviction for the offense 
of Selling Tobacco to a Minor should be reversed and re-
manded to the trial court with instructions to enter an 
Order dismissing the original Information with prejudice 
or other proceedings consistent with this Courtfs decision, 
DATED this CT^N day of Juiyr~T995v 
LOWELL D. CARLSEN 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I mailed two true and exact copies 
of the Brief of Appellant and Addendum to Appellant's 
Brief to Scott L. Wyatt, Attorney for Appellee, located 
at 255 North Main, Logan, Utah, 84321, postage prepaid and 
of July, 1993. 
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A D D E N D U M 
codified in this chapter, is described as follows: One and 
one-half to one and three-fourths inches in diameter/ the 
impression of which represents an eagle perched on a beehive 
and the inscription ••Corporate Seal of Logan City," and two 
stars in the margin, is declared to have been, that it is 
now, and hereafter shall be the corporate seal of the city. 
(Prior code §1-4-1) 
1,12.020 City name. The official name of the city 


























Violation—Class B misdemeanor. 
Violation—Misdemeanor. 
Continuing violation. 




Violation—Class B misdemeanor. All viola-
tions of this municipal code^ for which no lesser penalties 
are.provided, are classified as class,B misdemeanors, pun-
ishable by a fine not to exceed the sum of one thousand dol-
lars, or by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed 
six months or by both such fine and imprisonment. (Added 
during 1989 codification) 
9.24.040 Persons under the age of nineteen years—Sale 
of tobacco to. It is unlawful for any person to sell, give 
or furnish any cigar, cigarette or tobacco in any form to 
any person under nineteen years of age. (Prior code §12-7-
4) 
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76-10-103 CRIMINAL CODE 
76-10-103. Permitting minors to use tobacco in place of 
business-
It is a class C misdemeanor for the proprietor of any place of business to 
knowingly permit persons under age nineteen to frequent a place of business 
while they are using tobacco. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-103, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, ft 76-10-103. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur„ 2d. — 42 Am. Jur. 2d Infants § 18. 
C.J.S. — 43 CJ.S. Infants §§ 92, 95. 
Key Numbers. — Infants •» 13. 
76-10-104. Furnishing cigars, cigarettes or tobacco to 
minors — Penalties. 
Any person who sells, gives, or furnishes any cigar, cigarette, or tobacco in 
any form, to any pel f n under 19 years of age, is guilty of a class C misde-
meanor on the first Onense, a class B misdemeanor on the second offense, and 
a class A misdemeanor on subsequent offenses. 
History: C 1953, 76-10-104, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
1974, ch. 32, 5 39; 1989, ch. 194, $ 1. ment, effective July X. 1989, added "on the first 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1974, offense, a class B misdemeanor on the second 
ch. 32, § 39 repealed former § 76-10-104, as offense, and a class A misdemeanor on subse-
enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-10-104, relat- quent offenses'' at the end of the section and 
ing to use of cigars, cigarettes or tobacco in made a minor stylistic change. 
enclosed public place, and enacted present 
§ 76-10-104. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 42 Am. Jur. 2d Infants § 16. A.L.R. — Civil liability for tobacco sales to 
C.J.S. — 43 C.J.S. Infants §§ 92, 95. minors, 55 A.L.R.4th 1238. 
Key Numbers. — Infants «=» 13. 
76-10-105. Buying or possessing cigars, cigarettes, or 
tobacco by minors — Penalty — Compliance offi-
cer authority — Juvenile court jurisdiction. 
(1) Any person under the age of 19 years who buys, accepts, or has in his 
possession any cigar, cigarette, or tobacco in any form is guilty of a class C 
misdemeanor, or may be subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 
(2) A compliance officer appointed by a board of education under Section 
53A-3-402 may iss^  citations for violations of this section committed on 
school property. Cited violations shall be reported to the appropriate juvenile 
court. 
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76*2-304. Ignorance or mistake of fact or law. 
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves 
the culpable mental state is a defense to any prosecution for that crime. 
<2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal 
law is no defense to a crime unless: 
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably believed his 
conduct did not constitute an offense, and 
33 
78-7-25. Decisions to be rendered within sixty days — Pro-
cedures for decisions not rendered. 
(1) A judge of a trial court shall decide all matters submitted for final 
determination within 60 days of submission, unless circumstances causing the 
delay are beyond the judge's personal control 
(2) The Judicial Council shall establish reporting procedures for all matters 
not decided within 60 days of "final submission. 
History: L. 1969, ch. 249, § 1; 1977, ch. 77, decided by him which has been finally submit-
§ 67; 1988, ch. 248, § 47. ted for his consideration and determination be-
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- yond a sixty-day period unless circumstances 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, subdivided and causing such delay are beyond his personal 
rewrote the section which had read "No judge control." 
of the circuit court^or district court shall keep - —Cross-References, — Circuit courts, Chap 
in. his possession any matter H'controversyliot»4er.«4 of this title. 
174 
77-1-5. Prosecuting party, 
A criminal action for any violation of a state statute shall be prosecuted in 
; S o f t « * * * ***• A criminal action for violation ^ S £ 
STSolS" ** * Pn,SeCUted " *• name ° f the ««inSS 
J ^ l Z i F m * ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ d - ^ - n a m e of^the State of Utah/Utah 
Croes-Referlnce. _ Prosecutions to be ^ * * ^ § * 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «• 12. 
421 
—Time. 
Time fixed by statute was not jurisdictional. 
Rose v. District Court, 67 Utah 526,248 P. 486 
(1926). 
The time fixed by the statute was not juris-
dictional and since it was regarded as merely 
directory the further provision that a judgment 
should be rendered within a reasonable time 
has been judicially read into the statute. State 
v. Fedder, 1 Utah 2d 117, 262 P.2d 753 (1953). 
Time limits are directory, not mandatory, 
and trial court's failure to comply with them 
does not divest it of jurisdiction to pass sen-
tence; where sentence is imposed within a rea-
sonable time so that the delay does not amount 
to an abuse of the court's powers or adversely 
affect the defendant, he ia not entitled to go 
free but only to have a correct sentence im-
posed, with due consideration given for any 
time served because of the delay. State v. 
Helm, 563 P.2d 794 (Utah 1977). 
Defendant who was convicted in March, 
Failure to object to delay in pronouncing 
judgment waived the right to object. Rose v. 
District Court, 67 Utah 526,248 P. 486 (1926). 
Statements before sentencing. 
—Defendant 
Requirement that defendant be asked 
whether he has any cause why judgment 
should not be pronounced against him was sub-
stantially complied with by question as to 
whether he or his counsel had anything to 
state prior to sentencing. State v. McClendon, 
611 P.2d 728 (Utah 1980). 
The defendant's due process right of allocu-
tion was satisfied when the sentencing hearing 
was held in his presence, where he was ad-
dressed by the judge and elected to speak; an 
amended judgment subsequently entered by 
the trial court, at which the defendant was not 
present nor represented by counsel, reflected 
only a correction of a clerical mistake in his 
sentence. State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388 (Utah 
1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal 
Law § 526 et seq. 
C J.8. — 24 C J.S. Criminal Law § 1556 et 
seq. 
A.L.R* — Consideration of accused's juvenile 
court record in sentencing for offense commit-
ted as adult, 64 A.L.R.3d 1291. 
Loss of jurisdiction by delay in imposing sen-
tence, 98 A.L.R.3d 605. 
Propriety of sentencing justice's consider-
ation of defendant's failure or refusal to accept 
plea bargain, 100 A.L.R.3d 834. 
Accused's right to sentencing by same judge 
who accepted guilty plea entered pursuant to 
plea bargain, 3 A.L.R.4th 1181. 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *» 977 to 
996. 
Rule 23. Arrest of judgment 
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own 
initiative may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the 
facts proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the defendant is 
mentally ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment. Upon 
arresting judgment the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the of-
fense charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, order a commitment until 
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32A-12-203. Unlawful sale or supply to minors. 
• c*n offer to se22, or otherwise furnish or supply any 
(1) A person may ^ ^ £ p e r s o n under the age of 21 years, 
alcoholic beverage or F r o d u c ^ ^ / ^ b s e c t i o n (1) a person who knowingly (2) Except as < f ™ ^ a'ny alcoholic beverage 
sells, offers to sell, or " J * ^ 1 ^ ^
 0f 21 years is guilty of a class A 
or product to any person under trie age u , 
title. 
History: C. 1953, a Z A - l ^ n a c t e d byJL 
1985, ch. 175, § l; renumbered by L. 1990. 
en. 23, § 132; 1991, ch. 49, § 1; 1991, ch. 241, 
S
 ^°* J «,„» Not^s — The 1991 amend-Amendment Notes. w* ^ 
merit by ch. 49, effective March 13 1991, a*»a 
"; c.,k.~»./». i9i rf»«.<mated former Sub-
t,on of the section a class A ™^e™™?r™* 
provided a minimum mandatory fine of $500. 
The 1991 amendment *f™:*%£ 
April 29 1991, substituted "class B for class 
A'in the first sentence » former Subsection 
<3Th,s section is set out as reconciled by the 
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 10-3-928 
tence; and made various stylistic and phraseol-
ogy changes throughout the section. 
The 1987 amendment by ch. 228 added Sub-
section (6) and made minor changes in phrase-
ology and punctuation throughout the section. 
The 1989 amendment, effective July 1,1989, 
rewrote this section, which formerly provided 
for municipal justices of the peace. 
History: C. 1953, 10-3-931, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 48, § 3; redes, as 10-3-928; 1987, ch. 
140, § 1; 1991, ch. 268, § 2. 
Amended effective January 1, 1992. — 
Laws 1991, ch. 268, § 2 amends this section 
effective January 1, 1992. See amendment 
notes below. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment designated the existing language as Sub-
section (1); added Subsection (2); and made 
minor stylistic changes in Subsection (1). 
The 1991 amendment, effective January 1, 
The 1991 amendment, effective January 1, 
1992, designated the formerly undesignated 
language as Subsection (1), added Subsections 
- (2) through (8), and deleted "that is not a mu-
nicipal department or a primary location of the 
j circuit court" after "municipality" in Subsec-
1
 tion (1). 
1992, deleted the Subsection (1) designation 
and former Subsection (2), relating to appoint-
ments of city attorneys as deputy public prose-
cutors, rewrote the first sentence, which read 
'The city attorney may prosecute violations of 
city ordinances and has the same powers in 
respect to violations of city ordinances as are 
exercised by a county attorney in respect to 
violations of state law, including, but not lim-
ited to, granting immunity to witnesses for vio-
lations of city ordinances," and added the sec-
ond sentence. 
10-3-928. Attorney duties — Deputy public prosecutor [Ef-
fective until January 1, 1992]. 
(1) The city attorney may prosecute violations of city ordinances and has 
the same powers in respect to violations of city ordinances as are exercised by 
a county attorney in respect to violations of state law, including, but not 
limited to, granting immunity to witnesses for violations of city ordinances. 
(2) The city attorney may be sworn as a deputy public prosecutor by the 
attorney general, the county attorney of the county in which the city is situ-
ated, or any other public prosecutor having jurisdiction within the city limits. 
Appointments as deputy public prosecutor shall be for a period of time as 
specified at the time of oath taking but shall not exceed one year and shall be 
subject to renewal. Upon such oath, the city attorney may prosecute, in the 
name of the state of Utah, any class A misdemeanor enumerated as such by 
the Legislature and committed within the territorial limits of the city. 
Attorney duties — Deputy public prosecutor 
[Effective January 1, 1992]. 
In cities with a city attorney,-the city attorney may prosecute violations of 
city ordinances, and under state law, infractions and misdemeanors occurring 
within the boundaries of the mimicipality and has the same powers in respect 
to the violations as are exercised by a county attorney, including, but not 
limited to, granting immunity to witnesses. The city attorney shall represent 
the interests of the state or the municipality in the appeal of any matter 
prosecuted in any trial court by the city attorney. 
35 
ART. I, § 7 CONSTITUTION OF UTAII 
Gun control laws, validity and construe- Bear Arms, Lucilius A. Kmery, 23 Hrirv. 
tion of, 28 A. L. R. 3d 815. L. Kcv. 473. 
Restrictions on the Right To TV;»r Anus 
Law Reviews. —Slate and Federal Firearms Lcp.-.lnSimi, 
The Constitutional Right to Keep and 98 U. Pa. L. Rev. 005. 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
Comparable Provision. body, or agency authorized by law to de-
Montana Const., Art. I l l , §27. tcnuiiie the questions; (b) an inquiry 
in to thft marlttt *£ i l -
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused personso] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of 
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compul-
sory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public triai-by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the 
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Comparable Provision. —acquittal notwithstanding defect in in-
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
Cross-Reference. State •. J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100 
Prohibition on private nr ap^UI U*r« IT ft?** 116 P *>* 7 g f i — " 
Art. VTH, § 16 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Key Numbers. — Judges *» 10, 11. 
Sec, 16. [Public prosecutors-] 
The Legislature shall provide for a system of public prosecutors who shall 
have primary responsibility for the prosecution of criminal actions brought in 
the name of the State of Utah and shall perform such other duties as may be 
provided by statute. Public prosecutors shall be elected in a manner provided 
by statute, and shall be admitted to practice law in Utah. If a public prosecu-
tor fails or refuses to prosecute, the Supreme Court shall have power to ap-
point a prosecutor pro tempore. 
History: Const 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.), Compiler's Notes. — Former Article Vm 
S.J.R. 1. contained no comparable provisions. 
Sees. 17 to 28. [Repealed.] 






Mental illness — Use as a defense 
,— Influence of alcohol or other 
substance voluntarily con-
sumed — Definition. 
Voluntary intoxication. 
Voluntary termination of efforts 









Force in defense of person — Forc-
ible felony defined. 
Force in arrest. 
Peace officer's use of deadly force. 
Force in defense of habitation. 
Force in defense of property. 
Justification Excluding Criminal 
Responsibility 




76-2-10L Requirements of criminal conduct and criminal 
responsibility. 
No person is guilty of an offense unless his conduct is prohibited by law and: 
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negli-
gence, or with a mental state otherwise specified in the statute defining 
the offense, as the definition of the offense requires; or 
(2) His acts constitute an offense involving strict liability. 
These standards of criminal responsibility shall not apply to the violations 
set forth in Title 41, Chapter 6, unless specifically provided by law. 
History: C. 1953, 76-2-101, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-101; 1983, ch. 90, § 1; 
1983, ch. 98, § 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 76-2-103 
dangerous drugs as contributing to the delin-
quency of a minor, 36 A.L.R.3d 1292. 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «=» 23. 
76-2-102. Culpable mental state required — Strict liability. 
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable mental 
state, and when the definition of the offense does not specify a culpable mental 
state and the offense does not involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or 
recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility. An offense shall 
involve strict liability if the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a 
legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility for commission of the 
conduct prohibited by the statute without requiring proof of any culpable 
mental state. 
History: C. 1953, 76-2-102, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-102; 1983, ch. 90, § 2. 





In a prosecution for second degree murder, 
although the court's jury instruction did not 
expressly treat the element of knowledge, 
there was no error since the other jury instruc-
tions and the evidence of the defendant's ac-
tions left little room for the jury to misunder-
stand that the defendant must have been 
aware that his conduct created a grave risk of 
death to another, within the definitions con-
tained in the instructions. State v. Fontana, 
680 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984). 
Cited in State v. Whitehair, 735 P.2d 39 
(Utah 1987); In re Estate of Wagley, 760 R2d 
316 (Utah 1988); State v. Padilla, 776 P.2d 
1329 (Utah 1989). 
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720 North 400 East' 
Logan, Utah 
8/9/25 
D e f e n d a n t 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
No. 911001337 
The undersigned,C Andrews. , under oath, states on the information and 
belief that the above named Defendant committed the crime(s) of: 
SELLING TOBACCO TO A MINOR (CLASS B MISDEMEANOR) 
at Logan, Utah on 11/8/91 in violation of the following sections of the Revised 
Ordinances of Logan City: 
9.24.040 
That contrary to Logan City Ordinances, Defendant's acts constituting the 
offense(s) were: 
That the Defendant did sell, give or furnish any cigar, cigarette or tobacco in 
any form to a person under nineteen years of age. ClassBMisdemeanor 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses: 
J. G. GEIER, LCPD 
T. G. DURON, LCPD 
K. HAWKES, LCPD 
T. Barson 
J. Barson 
Authorized for presentment & f 
Log^r^j^/^osecutorTAttorney 
DAMAGES :W~ YES NO 
£LL±. d& IU*S 
COMPLAINANT 
Subscribed & sworn to before me 
this f day of p^_^ 19 <?/. 
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE 
Case No. j £ L 
DEC 1 2 1991 
By__ 
<xk dm Vm LMO 
SWc oJco^ r It) $ r ^ W G D 
it 
(TKAs 
&& tutu " 
«£OCAtrCITY, 




INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY 
CASE NO. 911001337 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
It is the duty of the Court to instruct you in the laws that apply to 
this case, and it is your duty as jurors to follow the laws as the Court 
states them to you, regardless of what you personally believe the laws 
are or ought to be. On the other hand;- it is your exclusive province to 
determine the facts in the case, and to consider and weigh the evidence 
for that purpose. 
INSTRUCTION NO: 1 
The Defendant, Lowell Carlsen is charged with the crimes of Selling 
Tobacco to a Minor, a Class p Misdemeanor, to wit: 
That the Defendant did sell, give or furnish any cigar, cigarette or 
tobacco in any form to a person under nineteen years of age. 
INSTRUCTION NO. \Q 
Before you may find the defendant guilty of the crime of Selling 
Tobacco to a Minor/ you must find from the evidence/ beyond a reasonable 
doubt/ all of the following elements of that crime/ to-wit: 
1. That the defendant did sell tobacco to a another person. 
2. That the other such person was under the age of 19 years. 
3. That the act did take place on or about Noveber 8# 1991. 
4. That the act did take place in Logan City/ Cache County/ State of 
Utah. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of the 
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt/ it is your 
duty to convict the defendant of this offense. On the other hand/ if the 
evidence has failed to so establish one or more of the said elements/ 
then you should find the defendant not guilty of this offense. 
Nathan Hult - 4704 
Attorney for Defendant 
P.O. Box 543 
110 North 100 East 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-7400 
IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
LOGAN CITY, * REQUEST FOR JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Plaintiff, * 
vs. * 
LOWELL D. CARLSEN, * Case No. 911001337 
Defendant. * 
The Defendant requests that the following jury instructions 
be given in addition to appropriate stock instruction. 
Dated this / day of January, 1992. 
Nathan Hult 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby give notice that I hand-delivered a copy of the 
foregoing: REQUEST FOR JURY INSTRUCTIONS to the below named 
individual on JLy^.- / £ / 1992. 
Scott Wyatt/ 
Logan City Prosecutor 
255 North Main 




An act committed or an omission made under an ignorance or 
mistake of fact which disproves the culpable mental state is a 
defense for that crime. 
Thus a person is not guilty of a crime if he commits an act 
or omits to act under an honest and reasonable belief in the 
existence of certain facts and circumstances which, if true, would 
made such act or omission lawful. 
K^UIJ." L U U K 1 , OXM.1.E. ur UIJI 
CACHE COUNTY, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 







We, the jurors in the above case, find the defendant, Lowell 
Carlsen, Guilty of Selling Tobacco to a Minor, a Class C Misdemeanor. 
Dated: \JAH / $ 92-
(/l&^ \IJfitm^^< 
Foreperson 
First Circuit Court, State of Utah, County of Cache. 
Logan Department 
STATg-Ol'1 UTAH LOGAN CITY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff 
No. ><//{'*.• - - f 
IHJMJjf (UAJIQI.K >^S 
Defendant 
Defendant (having^been adjudged) (entered a ploa of) GI7JLTY to the charge of
 A -
Count No. 1 ^ J//A m I &A. C W fAA d • J J /yUjtt£^> a Class 
Count No. 2 a Class 
Count No. 3 a Class 
Count No.4 a Class 
Misdemeanor, and no legal reason having been shown why judgment should not be pronounced, and Defendant being 
present (with) (having waived) Counsel. It is the judgment and sentence of the Court as follows: 
Count No. 1 Defendant is fined $ . plus surcharge of $ 
less the following suspended 
TOTAL TO BE PAID $ 
and to be imprisoned for _ days in the Cache County Jail with _ , days to be suspended on payment of fine. 
Count No. 2 Defendant is fined $ plus surcharge of $ 
less the following suspended $ 
TOTAL TO BE PAID $ 
and to be imprisoned for days in the Cache County Jail with days to be suspended on payment of fine. 
Count No. 3 Defendant is fined $ plus surcharge of $ 
less the following suspended $ 
TOTAL TO BE PAID $ 
and to be imprisoned for days in the Cache County Jail with days to be suspended on payment of fine. 
Count No. 4 Defendant is fined $ plus surcharge of $ 
less the following suspended $ 
TOTAL TO BE PAID $ 
and to be imprisoned for days in the Cache County Jail with days to be suspended on payment of fine. 
Stay of Execution to FRIDAY at 4:30 p.m. and the defendant is 
ordered to appear in Court at said time. Fine to be paid in installments of S per beginning 
met, -r ^ r/)i /--/«<? 
Defendant may appeal this judgment within 30 days to Court of Appeal in Salt Lake City^Utah. 
Dated. 
j L-4 S ' > J ^—t— / CIRCUIT JUDGE ^ < i S 
^ /Yp 4 O*7uo f>s<J> /' * -4uS -; < Case No. ^ k^ 
HOT 7 1Q00 
Nathan Hult - 4704 
Attorney for Defendant 
110 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 543 
Logan, Utah 84323-0543 
Telephone: (801) 753-7400 
- - '••'•  ' . " U C U i i 
'S2 Hull 4 PH 4 50 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 





NOTICE OF APPEAL AND 
REQUEST FOR RECORD 
Case No. 911001337 
TO THE CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY: 
The Defendant hereby gives notice of his appeal from the 
judgment and sentence entered on October 6, 1992. 
You are hereby requested to prepare, certify and transmit to 
the Court of Appeals of the State of Utah, with reference to the 
Notice of Appeal filed herewith, the record in the above case, 
prepared and transmitted as required by law, and the rules of said 
Court, and to include in said record, the following documents: 
ALL FILES AND TRANSCRIPTS PERTAINING TO THIS RECORD. 
DATED this H day of November, 1992. 
1*4** 
Nathan Hult 
Attorney for Defendant 
^ Casa No.lLY 
NOV 5 1992 
\ \ 
LOWELL D. CARLSEN 
Defendant in Pro Se 
720 North 400 East 
Logan, Utah 8432] 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
LOGAN CITY, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff(s) , 
-vs-
LOWELL D. CARLSEN 
Defendant. 
I certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the 
Notice of Appeal filed by Nathan Hult on November 4, 1992 in 
the above-entitled matter to Scott L. Wyatt, Logan City Prosecutor, 
located at 255 North Main, Logan, Utah on this 4th day of 
February, 1993. ,. 
.our 
'S3 FEB 4 PH 4 47 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Case No. 911001337 
NATHAN 1IULT 
Al IOHNI Y Al I AW 
PHONF (801) 753-7400 OFFICE 
fROI) 7«i?753R HOME I I O f J O H m 100 FAST 
(801) 753-7447 FAX LOGAN UTAH 84321 
March 11, 1992 
Judge K. Roger Bean 
437 Wasatch Drive 
Layton, UT 84041 
RE: State of Utah v. Lowell Carlsen 
Case No. 911001337 
Dear Judge Bean: 
Enclosed is a copy of Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss which we have filed with the court in the above noted case. 
If the court declines to grant our Motion to Dismiss, a 
conflict has arisen with the Sentencing date of March 30. Judge 
Pat Brian has scheduled State of Utah vs. Steven James, a murder 
trial, to begin on March 30 and continue for three weeks. Could 
we reschedule this Sentencing date for either before that time or 
after the trial concludes? 





cc: Scott Wyatt 
F I R S T C I R C U I T C O U R T , S T A T , E 0 r O i F o o U X A H -, 
DC ULL 60 n i l iO i 
CACHE COUNTY, LOGAN DEPARTMENT 
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 
LOGAN CITY 
Plaintiff, No. 911001337 
vs. Date 10-13-92 
LOWELL D, CARLSEN 
Defendant Judge Bean 
MATTER: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
At the sentencing herein on October 6, 1992, defense counsel 
moved the court to dismiss the charge on the ground that 
Defendant had not agreed to postpone sentencing beyond the 30 
day period provided in Rule 22(a), URCrimP. That Rule 
provides: 
Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or 
plea of no contest, the court shall set a time for 
imposing sentence which shall be not less than two 
nor more than 30 days after the verdict or plea, 
unless the court, with the concurrence of the 
defendant, otherwise orders. 
The cases cited in the annotation following the Rule are to 
the effect that the time fixed is directory, not jurisdic-
tional . 
But in any event, it is clear from a review of the judge's 
trial notes that Defendant concurred in setting sentencing in 
this case beyond the 30 day period. Because the sentencing 
was to be by a visiting judge, various dates beyond the 30 day 
limit were first discussed without objection from the defense, 
but no date could be agreed on. It was the clerk's office 
which actually set the date, and there can be no doubt it 
cleared it with defense counsel's office first. On the date 
for sentencing, defense counsel's secretary telephoned the 
judge asking for a continuance because counsel was involved in 
a trial in Salt Lake that day. She agreed to call again later 
that day or the next, presumably to reset the matter for 
sentencing. That call did not come. 




LOWELL D. CARLSEN 
Defendant in Pro Se 
720 North 400 East 
Logan, Utah 84321 
'93 Mi 20 fin 3 08 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
LOGAN CITY, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
LOWELL D. CARLSEN, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 911001337 
NOTICE is hereby given that the above-named defendant, 
Lowell D. Carlsen hereby appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals 
from the written Memorandum of Decision and Order denying Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss presented at sentencing. Said written Memorandum 
of Decision and Order denying Defendant's Motion was filed with the 
Clerk of the above-entitled Court on the 28th day of December, 1992 
and received by defense counsel on the 30th day of December, 1992. 
(A copy attached hereto and made a part hereof). The defendant 
requests that this appeal be consolidated with the appeal currently 
pending in the Utah Court of Appeals under case no. 920739-CA from 
a Notice of Appeal filed within 30 days after the sentencing of 
the defendant. Judgment and sentence was imposed and entered on 
the 6th day of October, 1992. 
DATED this // clay of January, 199 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the foregoing 
Notices of Appeal to Scott L. Wyatt, Logan City Prosecutor, Jocated 
at 255 North Main, Logan, Utah, 84321, postage prepaid and by 


























CCUI:TY or CACHE, LOGAI: CITY DEPARTMENT 
-
ioCo-
LOGAN CITY, ) 
Plaintiff, ) Case No. 911001337 
vs. ) PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF 
) JUrY TRIAL 
LOWELL D. CARLSEN, ) /^/f^lQf^V 
Defendant. ) \^>%JJ |] U 
-oQo-
BE IT rJZJTIIEEREC that on the 16th day of 
January, 1C-S2, the above-entitled action was held before 
the HONORABLE RCHER BEAN, sitting as Judge in the above-
earned Court, and that the following proceedings were had. 
-oCo-
A ? r E A R A H C E S 
ITor the Ci-y. CCCTT L. S7YATT 
j Logan City Prosecutor 
2!! 5 !Torth Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
For the Defendant: NATHAN HULT 
Attorney at Law 
110 North 100 East 
Logan, Utah 84321 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, C.S.R. 
3241 SOUTH 4840 WEST 
WEST VALLEY CITY, UTAH 84120 
j PHONE. 966-4862 
1 
2 I State of Utah/City of Logan vs. Lowell D. Carlsen 
3 Page 
4 MOTION TO DISMISS EY MR. HUL1] 
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6 JERREN BARSON 
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witness stand, and was examined and t e s t i f i e d as fo l lows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
3Y MR. liULT; 
si Would you p lease s t a t e your name for the record? 
A I'm Jerren Barson. 
Q Okay. And would you s p e l l your l a s t name for 
the record? 
A 3-a-r-s-o-n. 




w Cache Valley, Utah? 
A Yeah. 
Q And how old are you? 
A Sixteen. 
Q Drawing to your attention an incident that 
occurred on or about November 8th, 1991. Did you have 
occasion to be present at Carlsen*s ga3 station and car 
wash in the City of Logan? 
A Yes. 
Q And were you at that time acting in cooperation 




Who was that law enforcement officer? 
5 
1
 A Gil D—Durand or whatever. 
2
 Q Gil Durand? 
3
 A Yeah. 
4




 A Yes. 
7
 Q Did he make a request of you that you attempt to 
8 buy tobacco at the Carlsen Gas and Car Wash? 
9 A Yes. Well, yeah. 
10 Q Okay. And did you in fact go to the Carlsen Gas 
11 and Car Wash? 
12 A Yes. 
13 g And while you were there, did you meet Lowell 
14 Carlsen, who is .seated here at the defense table? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q Did you make a purchase of tobacco from him? 
17 I A Uh huh (affirmative). 
MR. HULT: Okay. Those are the only questions I 
have for this witness at this time, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
21 I Mr. Wyatt, any questions? 
22
 MR* WYATT: Ho, not at this time. 
23 I THE COURT: Not at this time? 






 it B-a-r? 
6 
1
 I M*. trw™?-
 V c u r a o n o r # 7>-nay I object? This is—{ 
2
 I this is conduct that occurred after the purchase and 
3
 surely i t ' s not relevant to entrapment. 
4
 These questions we1re leading into are al l post-
5 I date the time of the time. I 3imply— 
THE COURT; Well, I can't t e l l for sure at this 
7
 I point whether or not they would cast—cast some--perhaps 
8 some other evidance we have heard or might hear, in a light 
9 that would have a.bearing. 
10 I ' l l overrule i t at this time and you may go ahead\ 
11 Mr. Hult. 
12 Q (3y Mr, Hult) Did you see where Officer Geier 
13 went after he left? 
14 A Yes. He ran up the street , up where they had a— 
15 they had a car, a police car parked about a half a block up 
16 the street. 
17 Q Okay. 
18 A On the north side of the street. 
19 2 And did you see other individuals in that police 
20 car after Officer Geier went up there? 
21 A Yes. Because after he had cited me and everything,) 
22 the police car come—after I was cited and everything was 
23 done, the police car come down this way. This—Mr. Duron 
24 put his head out the window and laughed at me real loud. 
25 Q Okay. Were there— 
21 
1
 A I couldn ' t f igure what he was laughing a t ne for, 
2




 Q Were there other individuals in the car? 
5
 A Yes. There was a person on the other side. The 
6
 only one I recognized is him, but there was one on the other 
7
 side and one in the back seat. 
8 Q Okay. Thank you. 
9
 MR. IIULT; I have no further questions. 
10 THE WITKESS: Okay. 
11 THE COURT: Thank you. 
12 Further cross? 




16 Q This particular individual, you indicated you had 
17 a hard time remembering exactly who he was for sure. 
18
 A Yes. All I can remember is the appearance— 
19 Q And™ 
20
 A —at the time, that he was old, because I do not 
21 sell— 
22
 Q Now— 
23
 A —cigarettes to minors. 
24
 Q You do not sell cigarettes— 
25
 A No. 
1
 — 1* CCUn*". — 1 U C 1 3 3 7 , Logan City vs. Carlsen# 
2 and that all of our jurors are present. Mr. Carlsen is 
3 present <*nd loth counsel arc present. 
4
 Let's ^ee# members of the jury, I think our next 
5 3tep appropriately, is to have you stand and receive an 
6 oath from the clerk to well and truly try the case, and 
7 would you do that, please, stand and raise your right 
8 hands. 
9 (Whereupon, the jury panel was duly sworn 
10 by the clerk of the Court.) 
11 THE COURT; Thank you. And you nay be seated 
12 again. 
13 Judge Judkins follows a procedure in his cases 
14 of giving some of the instructions to the jury preliminarily,] 
15 that i s , ahead of the evidence, and I 'D going to follow 
16 that procedure this morning. 
17 These instructions that I'm going to read to you, 
18 you will have v/ith you when you <jo to the jury room, you 
19 nay refer to then again, and I ' l l try to read them to you 
20 in c. way that won't put you to sleep, but we'll just ask 
21 you to be as attentive to them as you can. 
22 Members of the jury, you've been selected and 
23 sworn in as the jury to try the case set forth above. 
24 This is a criminal case. 
25 The Information reads as follows: Circuit Couxt, 
45 
1
 bach in th2 Court shortly. 
2 (thereupon, the jury was excused from the 
3 courtroom.) 
4
 THE COURT; I bel ieve i f you ' re able to take th i s 
5 jury to the jury room, j u s t leave us on the record and we111 
6 be a l l r i g h t . Le t ' s do t h a t . 
7 T,.Te have good security—thank you. 'Je have good 
8 secur i ty in t h i s bui ld ing. 
9 The record w i l l show that our j u ro r s have l e f t 
10 the courtrooia. Mr. Carlsen and both counsel are present . 
11 Mr. h u l t , would you l ike to iapeak to your motion. 
12 Zo tha t we 're sure the record picks i t up, our conference 
13 at the bench had t h i s microphone facing away from you, 
14 your notion i s—wel l , why don ' t you go ahead and r e s t a t e 
15 i t ? 
16 MR. IICLT: Yes, your Honor. The defendant has 
17 been charged under City ordinance 9.24.040, sale of 
18 tobacco to a person under iS--under 19 years of age. 
19 There is--and it has been charged as a Class E 
20 nisdemeanor as provided by City ordinance 1.16.010— 
21 THE CCURT: Excuse r;,e. Let me interrupt you for 
22 just a moment. 
23 Do you need to communicate with the bailiff? 
24 THE CLZRK: I did. 
25
 I THE CODST: All r igh t . They're in your care then? 
43 
laiLi you. "* 11 r^jnt. 
9 
Please jo aheaJ# Ar. dult. 
dR* dULT; That latter ordinance providing that 
ail violations Tjr which no lesser penalty is provided in 
5 j the municipal code 4ili be a Class 2 misdemeanor, and the 
6 Information shots in fact that he is charged with a Class B 
7 I .ai a demeanor. 
8
 | There is a state statute that covers the same 
offense of furnishing tobacco to a person under the age of 
10 I 13, Utah Code 7 6-10-104. That particular statute raakes it 
11 a. Class C raisdeuoancr on the first offense, Class L 
12 usdesnaanor on the second offense, and Class A raisdeneanor 
13 .n any subsequent offense. 
14
 I*o particular nuraLer of offenses charged in the 
15 Information which is, in and of itself, a significant 
16 defect; but in the—this particular case, where no second 
17 or third offenjo ^3 charjed, it can be no more than a 
18
 Class C misdemeanor under the State Jtatute. 
19 !Icw, what io ;ou lo when you 'rave two statu—a 
20 ctate statute and a City ordinance that are in conflict? 
21 Under the State of Allgood vs. Larson, 5 43 P. 2d I3C, a 
22 case dealing with a conviction of trespassing under a Salt 
23 Lake City ordinance, the Utah Supreme Court jaid that t h e — 
24 that the City ordinance xs void. 
25 in this particular case, the provision that the 
4S 
V.-0. Lmf i k s i S ** »n~ i ir. 
the defendant Lz 
the State .uutUt 
» ...» W w W « 
A . 1 rj, -I <*-
voi*"' 












ordinance with which they're charging 
because itfr in direct conflict with 
Thank you. Mr. Uyatt? 
Your Honor, if this is a concern, the 
city prosecutors the authority to 
.or State lav, and I would just move to 
The lanauage is the same under 
and move to amend the Information v;hich I 
can do by interlineation to charge the defendant with 
violating Utah Code 76-10-10 4. 
THE COUHT: All right. Thank you. 
Could the problem be cured, Mr. Hult, dimply by 
having hin amend it to ~,how a Cla3s C misdemeanor? 
!1R. IIULT; Your Honor, we are opposed to the 
amendment in this case charging him with a violation of a 
3tate law rather -han a City ordinance, albeit that the— 
.hey cover -he :ame ground or the same material. 
I think at this late late, that an amendment is 
improper. In addition, I think that given the fact that 
they've choaen to proceed under the City ordinance rather 
than the Ttate statute is another reason that they should 
not be permitted to amend at this time. 
THE CCU2T: "Tell, let me ask one other question. 
If—if defendant--if the trial proceeds and the defendant 
50 
1 were to be convicted, if the penalty were simply limited, 
2 the sentence limited to a Class C misdemeanor sentence, 
3 would that cure the problem? 
4
 MR. HULT: Your Honor, the—the way that I read 
5 Allgood vs. Larson is that— 
6 THE COURT: Do you have the year of that case, 
7 Mr. Hult? 
8 MR. HULT: Yes. It1s 197 6. 
9 THE COURT: All right. 
10 MR. HULT; It's a decision by Justice Maughan. 
11 The specific language that they Juote from the McQuillin is-
12 well, just to back up a moment. Under the—the matter was 
13 brought as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and— 
14 and the Court said that the conviction was invalid. And 
15 they quote McQuillin as saying if the ordinance penalty 
16 conflicts with that of the general law of the state 
17 governing the same subject, the ordinance penalty is void. 
18 The charter ordinance penalty cannot exceed that of the 
19 State law. 
20 THE COURT: Well , t h a t ' s the q u e s t i o n I was j u s t 
21 addressing, when i t says the penalty is void, that's 
22 different than saying the ordinance is void. 
23 MR. HULT: It is; however, in this particular 
24 case, they didn't just overturn the punishment, but they 
25 overturned the conviction. 
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1
 A Ho, 1 didn' t . 
2
 g liow did you get his attention? 
3
 A ile just looked up when I got there. He was just— 
4
 could like see both way3. 
5 Q Okay. Was he s i t t ing or standingf at that time? 
6
 A He was s i t t ing . 
7
 Q Okay. You didn' t have to say anything to get his 
8 attention? 
9 A No. 
10 Q After you had asked him for Camel Lights, you say 
11 that he asked you if you were 19 years of age? 
12 A Yes . 
13 Q And what did you do then? 
14 A I did not answer him. 
15 Q You didn't answer? 
16 A Huh uh (negative). 
17 Q what did he do next? 
18
 A Then he just reached down and got them. 
19 Q Without asking you any more questions? 
20 A Yeah. I didn' t answer when he a3ked me if I was 
21 19 . 
22 Q why do you think he asked you if you were 19? 
23 A To—I don't know. 
24 Q The rest of the sales took place inside that 
2 5

























BY MR. iiULT; 
Q I assume that when you're saying the individual 
with the brown suit jacket, you1re referring to the dark 
brown rather than the light brown? 
A Correct. I'd say yours is tan. 
Q In your—did you indicate that you did not have a 
view of Jerren at the window, but you only had a view of 
the shed? 
A I saw him approach the shed and it was clear that 
he was on the other side of the shed, but I w a s — I did not 
have visual contact during the actual transaction, no, 
Q Okay. When you came, was it minutes later or less 
than a minute later after Jerren had made the purchase and 
told Carlsen what had happened, and he was extremely upset 
when he heard that? 
A Would you ask that again? 
Q Okay. 
A I'm not aure I understand. 
Q It sounds like—I think I asked you a compound 
question. 
A Yeah, you did. 
23
 | Q How soon after Jerren made his purchase did you 
show up at the window? 






U Okay, And you told Mr. Car Is en that you were 
there because he had just sold somebody—tobacco to somebody 
who was under age? 
A Correct. 
5
 I Q And did he immediately get quite upset when he 
6
 heard that? 
7
 A Well, he—he got on the defensive, if you would, 
8
 as far as his conversation went. 
9
 J Q Okay. Now, what he told you specifically was 
that the person looked 19, that hefd asked him three times 
if he was 19, and that he said he was 19? 
12 I A That1s correct. 
13 Q Do you recall him going beyond that and telling 
14
 you that in fact he'd asked the kid what month and what year 
15 he was born in? 
16 I A So. I don't recall that. 
2 Okay. Now, when you said—you said you asked him 
if he had requested an I.D. and Mr. Carlsen said he had not? 
A Correct. 
Q You would agree, would you not, with Todd Barson, 
21
 | that the State law does not state that a seller of tobacco 
22
 I has to require an I.D.? 
23 | A That the law—say that again. 
24
 I Q Okay. The State statute does not require a 
25











A I believe that's true, ye3. 
Q Okay. Is it not true that Mr. Carlsen asked you 
to 3ee thi3 individual that had—that had just allegedly 
5
 | bought the tobacco from him? 
A I do not recall that, either. 
7
 I Q What was your purpose in going back to the car? 
8
 A To talk with Officer Duron. 
9
 I Q Okay. Is it not true, though, that before you 
went back to that car, CarIsen said there is no way that 
that kid who had bought the tobacco from him was less than 
12 I 19 years of age, he looked 19 years of age, and he wanted 
13 to see him? 
14
 A No. I n e v e r — d o n ' t remember any c o n t e x t of t h a t 
15 kind— 
16 g Okay. 
17
 I A — i n the conversation. 
Q Do you recall any time that evening, either prior 
to going back to Officer Duron's vehicle, or when you came 
back again and issued the citation, Mr.--telling Mr. Carlsen,| 
21 you can see him in court? 
22
 A I do recall making a statement to him because o f — 
23 because of the way the conversation was eventually going, 
24 that after I made a determination to issue the citation, 
25





 the judge and before the C o u r t — 
2 J Okay. 
3 A — i f he felt that it was unjust. 
4
 Q But in that context, is it not correct that 
5 Mr. Carlsen did not believe the person that he had sold to 
6 looked anything less than 19 years of age, and wanted to 
7 see him right then and there, see what he looked like? 
8 A Well, his initial argument, as I stated, w a s — 
9 was to the effect that his basis for selling it was that he 
10 thought he was 19, he looked 19 in his judgment, and that 
11 he'd asked—made inquiry three times as to his age. And he 
12 stated to me that Jerren had stated he was 19. 
13 Now, in talking with Jerren at the time, prior to 
14 making contact— 
15 Q We I l -
ls A — h e had denied that. 
M Q Okay. 3ut getting back to my question. You, a.t 
18 some point, indicated that Mr. Carlsen could see him in 
19 Court a n d — 
20 A No, I never said that. 
21 Q Okay. Y o u — y o u — I take it y o u — 
22 A I would not have said that. I did n o t — 
23 Q You don't at this point recall Mr. Carlsen 
24 asking to see this person that had bought the tobacco 




























r e c a l l . 
Q 
seconds. 
r eco rd , 
No. I do no t . 
T h a t ' s not to say he d i d n ' t a sk , bu t I d o n ' t 
Okay. 
MR. 2IULT; I d o n ' t have any f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n s . 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
F u r t h e r d i r e c t ? 
MR. WYATT; No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may s t e p down, Mr. Ge i e r . 
MR. WYATT; Your Honor, i f I could have j u s t 30 
THE COURT: You may. ^?e f l l go off the r e c o r d . 
(Off the r e c o r d . ) 
MR. /7YATT: The C i ty would r e s t a t t h i s t ime . 
THE COURT: A l l r i g h t . W e ' l l go back on the 
i f we 1 re not a l r e a d y . 
The CiLy has r e s t e d . 
: i r . H u l t , you may go ahead. 
MR. HULT: Your Honor, I wonder if, at this time, 
it would be appropriate for raa to renew ny motion that I 
have made previously/ or if the Court would wish us to 
proceed at this time. 
THE COURT: Let's see. Maybe it's appropriate to 
take a recess• Let's excuse the jury and take the time we 



























don't ail -waste our tine, that's maybe the best way to do 
it* 
Does that sound all right, Mr. Uult? 
MR. HOLT: That sounds fine, your Honor. The 
only thing 1 want to do because I1 in uncertain as to 
whether I did previously, is to place on the record our 
objection to the motion to amend. I think we discussed it, 
but Ifm not 3ure if I stated outright that we object— 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. HULT: — t o the motion to amend. 
THE COURT; All right. The record will show your 
objection, and I've treated that as if it had been stated. 
Mr. Wyatt, is there anything you want to add to 
what we've said? 
MR. WYATT: Ko. I think that everything's been 
said. Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. The Court now grants the 
prosecution's motion to amend, to substitute the State of 
Utah in place of Logan City as the prosecuting agency, and 
grants the motion to amend to refer to the State statute as 
the governing legal provision, specifically Section—can't 
find it here. Thank you. 76-10-104 of the Utah Code, and 
grants the motion to identify it as a Class C misdemeanor. 
And the Court does that, as I say, for the 
purpose of getting the issue to the jury in the proper form, 
jan. 
at least tentatively, and then if that's—if that's not 
correct, a later decision by the Court will remedy that. 
If it—if it can be done, and ti's correct, we won't have 
wasted the jury's tine and the witnesses' and counsel's 
and everyone's time. So, I think that's the best way to 
proceed, and the Court now grants that motion. 
The Court continues and keeps under advisement 
defendant's motion, however, to dismiss, because of the 
conflict between the ordinance and the State statute. 
MR. rfULT; One matter, other matter of clarifica-
tion* Does the—the amendment also include changing the 
plaintiff? 
THE COURT: I think I did say that, yes, that the 
motion includes substituting the State of Utah in place of 
Logan City as the prosecuting agency. 
I1R. r,?YATT: One question that I would have, your 
Honor. You indicated you were reserving the motion to 
dismiss based on the inconsistency. 
THE COURT: Uh huh (affirmative). Well, I guess 
what I'm saying is, I'm not sure you have the right to 
amend at this point. 
MR. WYATT: Oh. 
THE COURT: I'm not sure but what the motion of 
the defendant is well taken, that you have a conflict here 
between the City ordinance and the State statute and it's 
91 
1
 too late to cure it. I think that's what Mr. Hult's 
2
 position is; that the jury's been sworn and defendant's in 
3 jeopardy, and I think what he's saying is, if that's a bad 
4
 approach to the prosecution, then it can't be brought 
5 again. I suppose that would be your argument. 
6
 MR. HULT: Yes, if there was a refiling, but 
7
 more particularly, at this point in tine, that that one 
8 statute giving them authority to prosecute State statutes 
9 doesn't apply to something that occurred before January 1st, 
10 in addition to the prejudice that the defendant155 suffering 
11 at this late stage of the proceedings. 
12 THE COURT: All right. You're not abandoning any 
13 position that the defendant nay be prejudiced by the 
14 amendment at this stage. I — 
15 MR. HULT; No. No. No, we're— 
16 THE COURT; I imagine you're s t i l l claiming that? 
17 MR. xlULT: We certainly aren ' t abandoning that. 
18 THE COURT: All r ight . All r ight . Than}; you. 
19 Well, l e t ' s go ahead and take our recess, and then 
20 ifra going to instruct the jury that we've changed the name 
21 of the case to that extent, and go ahead and finish up. 
22 MR. WYATT: C k a y . 
23 THE COURT: All right. Court's in recess. 
24 (Whereupon, the recess was taken.) 
25 (Whereupon, discussion on jury instructions 
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1 asked f o r - - I c a n ' t remember what brand i t was, no* 
2 Q Ckay. May—might he have asked for a p a r t i c u l a r 
3 brand? 
4
 A Yes. Probably l i d . I d i d n ' t pay any a t t e n t i o n 
5 to it. 
6
 Q What—why did you ask him if he was 19? 
7
 A /Jell, I just had been asking everyone, unless 
8 they were 40. 
9 Q Okay. What did he respond to you? 
10 A When I asked hin how old he was? 
11 Q Yes. 
12 A He said he was 19. 
13 Q Okay. How old did he look to you? 
14 A He looked between 22, 23 years old, to me. 
15 Q Did you observe the individual that was—identifie4 
16 himself as Jerren, that testified here earlier? 
17 A Yes. I looked at him here in the Court, uh huh 
18 (affirmative) . 
19 Q Did he appear any different to you that night than 
20 he appears in Court now? 
21 A Certainly did, he seemed like he was a lot older, 
22 he looked a lot higher than he did here. 
23 Q Did you notice anything different about him in 
24 particular that night? 
25 A Well, it looked like he had a little growth, 
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1 actually a little growth of beard there or something, a 
2 little like ha hadn't shaved or something. 
3 Q Did you notice anything else different about him? 
4
 A No. Just--
5 Q Okay. 
6 A His hair seemed to be a little different, a lot 
7 different than it was today, seemed to be a shorter cut and—| 
8 Q What happened after you asked him if he was 19? 
9 A Well, then I asked him what month and year he 
10 was born, and he—• 
11 Q Okay. Let me ..back up a minute. He did respond 
12 when you asked him if he was 19? 
13 A Yes, uh huh (affirmative). 
14 Q Do you recall exactly what he said? 
15 A He said he was 19. 
16 Q Okay. Do you remember what hi3 words were? 
17 A You mean when I asked him how old he was? 
18 Q Yeah. 
19 A He said, "I'm 19". 
20 Q What happened then after you asked him what month 
21 and year he was born? 
22 A He didn't bat an eye, he said December • 71. 
23 Q Okay. Tfhy did you ask him that question? 
24 A Well, if they're—if there is anything wrong, 







*aight say '73, '74, most people lon't know. 
Q Okay. What happened after he responded to that 
question? 
A I just told hira you1 re almost 20 years old then 
and he said—he nodded his head, that he—like that. 
Q Okay. And then what—what after you-—what 
happened after you uiade that comment to hira? 
A Well, then, I just give hini the cigarettes, sold 
him the cigarettes. 
Q Okay. You had earlier been informed, possibly two 
aonths earlier/ of the law of selling tobacco to minors? 
A Gh, yes, I've known for 42 years that they've got 
to be 19 to buy cigarettes. 
Q Okay. 
A I t was no th ing new to me, I know t h e y ' v e got t o be 
13. 
^ «*nd do you r e c a l l l i r . 3 a r son coming around to 
you? 
A Yes, uh huh ( a f f i r m a t i v e ) . 
Q And ^ave you a little sign to put up in your 
A Well, then an officer just a minute or two minutes J 
three minutes, four minutes, an officer came around to the 
window. 
Q Okay. Kas that—do you recall if that was the 
Game Officer Geier that testified here? 
A Same one. Officer Geier, uh huh (affirmative). 
Q What did he say when he came around? 
A He said that I'd just sold cigarettes to a minor. 
Q What did you respond? 
A I told him it wasn't a minor, that guy was 19. 
I asked him first, I says, was it that person that just 
left here? And he says yes, and I says, that person is 19. 
Q f.Jhat did he say then? 
A He said that he wasn't 19, and I says, well, I 
told him he was as big as he was, looked ^ust the sane age 
as he was. 
Q What happened after that? 
A Well, then they—he—I said—just insisting that 
he was 19, I told him about, that I'd a3ked him the month 
and year and all about, so he says, jU3t a minute, and he 
left and went up the street. And then hef a few rrinutes 
later, he came back, and he says, the boy said he—you 
didn't ask him his age. 
Q Had you asked him his age? 





























Q What did you—what did you next ask the officer, 
then? 
A Well, then, I — 
Q Or I should say, did you rr.ake a request of the 
officer then? 
A Yes. I requested that he bring the boy back, I 
v/anted to see him standing to the side of the officer to-— 
'cause I tola him he was just as big as he was. 
C Uh huh (affirmative). 
A Every b i t as b ig , and jus t - - looked ju s t as old. 
Q When you asked him to bring the kid hack, what 
did he say? 
A He says, You can see him in Court. 
Q Okay. And I take i t he d i d n ' t br ing the kid 
Lack for you to see what he looked l ike tha t night? 

















have no further 
1
 CROSS~EXAI:II:ATIQN 
2 3Y MR. VJYATT: 
3 Q If I understand itf you "lid sell cigarettes to 
4 this individual? 
5 A Yes, 
6 Q And from your—what you've indicated to us, your 
7 conversation with him was limited to a couple short 
8 questions? 
9 A Just a few questions. 
10 Q ¥ou asked him, How old are you? 
11 A Yes, 
12 Q And what you're te l l ing us i s that he answered 
13 19? 
14 A Yes# s i r . 
15 Q And then you asked him what his birthday was? 
16 A I asked him month and year of his b i r th . 
17 Q And why did you do that? 
18 A Just to— 
19 Q Double-check? 
20 A --double-check. 
21 Q To make sure? 
22 A That that was how old he was. 
23 Q But you thought he looked 21 or 22 or 23? 

































: understand i t , you 




And from your—what you1 
c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h him was l i m i t e d 









did s e l l c i g a r e t t e s 
v e 
t o 
asked him, How old are 
what you're t e l l i n g us 
indicated 
a couple a 
you? 




i s that he answered 
19? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And then you asked hin what his birthday was? 
A I asked him month and year of his birth. 
Q And why did you do that? 
A Just to— 
Q Double-check? 
A —double-check, 
Q To make sure? 
A That that was how old he was. 
Q But you thought he looked 21 or 22 or 23? 
A Yeah, along in there, uh huh (affirnative), 22, 
23. 
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1 THE COURT: All right. It13 in the hands of the 
2 jury. 
3 Court's in recess. 
4 (Whereupon, the recess was taken.) 
5 THE COURT; We've returned to File 911001337, 
6 Layton City against—pardon me, Logan City, also the State 
7 of Utah, against Lowell D. Carlsen. 
8 Our jurors have returned, they've indicated that 
9 they've reached a verdict. I ' l l ask the bailiff to 
10 retrieve the verdict, bring i t to the bench. Thank you. 
11 The record should also reflect that Mr. Carlsen 
12 and both counsel are present. 
13 The verdict is in proper form. I ' l l ask the 
14 clerk to read the verdict. 
15 THE CLERK; TCe, the jurors in the above case, 
16 find the defendant, Lowell Carlsen, guilty of selling 
17 tobacco to a minor, a Class C misdemeanor. Signed, Troy 
18 Jenkins, foreperson. 
19 THE COURT: T h a n k y o u . 
20 Members of the jury, you've taken time, as we 
21 said before, out from busy lives, to make i t possible for 
22 our system to work. We express thanks to you. 
23 We're going to address some sentencing considera-
24 tions and motion considerations that have arisen previously. 
25 We excuse you now. You also get to keep that large check, 
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but you had to work harder for it. Ke thank you for your 
service in this case. Thank you very much. 
Counsel, that moves us on to the next stage. 
l.r. Hultr would you be willing to postpone sentencing 
while the Court considers the questions that you've raised 
in your earlier motions that are under advisement? 
MR. HULT: We would prefer postporing sentencing, 
would we not, until the Judge has had a chance to rule on 
the motions? 
MR. CAELSEK: Yes. 
THE COURT; I think that might be the best. All 
right. Thank you. 
Is that agreeable, Mr. Wyatt, to— 
MR. WYATT: That's fine. 
THE COURT: —the City, State, whichever it turns 
out to be. 
MR. WYATT: Whoever I am. 
THE COURT; As—whoever you are; has no objection 
to that, Ifm sure. 
All right. Let's see, so that we don't just 
absolutely lose it, if I set a date for sentencing and then 
get back and get busy on this, maybe thatfs the best thing 
to do. What, 60 days from now, and I don't expect it to 
take that long, but let me give you a sentencing date, if 









at something five or 
normally would the Judge do—use for 
(Inaudible) 
All right. Sometimes that is a good 
Would you like me to— 
Yes, would you do that? Let's look 
six weeks away, toward the end of 
February. 
I ' v e got one o r two t h ings under advisement , bu t 
I want to move r i g h t ou t on t h i s one , I d o n ' t want i t t o 
d r ag , so I ' l l t r y t o ge t a t i t and see where we a r e on those 
l e g a l p o i n t s , and what I ' l l do i s i s s u e a w r i t t e n memorandum 
of d e c i s i o n and send counsel a copy of i t . I assume we've 
got addresses i n t he f i l e ? 
MR. WYATT: Should have, we— 
THE COURT; Mr. Hu l t , Pos t Off ice Box 543, 110 
Itorth 100 E a s t , Logan. 
MR. HULT: Yes. 
THE COURT: And, let's see, Mr. Wyatt, I'm not 
sure I've got anything with your— 
MR. WYATT: My—my objection to motions to 
dismiss. 
THE COURT; Oh, yes, that'll be in here. Okay. 
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I I p r o c - E D i r r a 
2 
3 I THE COURT; 'le'll go ahead with the natter before 
4
 the Court, *.;hich is a sentencing, and ';he Clerk reminds me, 
5 Mr. Hult, that I did not—with respect to the two motions 
6 that were before the Court at the conclusion of the trial, 
7 I did not issue a formal opinion and I think I had indicated 
8 to you by setting the sentencing earlier, that the Court's 
9 decision would be consistent with that, that is with a — 
10 imposing a sentence; and so perhaps it is appropriate at 
II this time that I go ahead and briefly announce a decision 
12 on those two motions. 
13 The Court had sortie reservation at the tine that 
14 the prosecution move to amend, that they—that it needed to 
15 do that, that that was an appropriate motion and it raised 
16 a question, I think, at that time, and then of course, kept 
17 under advisement that motion and the defense motion to 
18 disraiss. 
19 And you have since, and I appreciated your doing 
20 that, you have since filed with the Court a memorandum of 
21 law referring to the Allgood case and to some other 
22 authorities, and I've considered those and actually done 
23 considerable research in February and March on this question 
24 and was prepared to state at the bench, as I ani now, at the 
25 time of sentencing, the Court's decision on those two 
2 
1
 motions, and then of course, that 3entencing was continued 
2 and the case kinda got into the backwaters and didn't get 
3 back on the main track, and so it came to my attention the 
4
 other lay and I asked the clerk to reset it. 
5 Is there any question you have that, before we 
6 go to sentencing or any comment you'd like to make on any 
7 of the matters before the Court imposes sentence? 
8 MR. HULT: Your Honor, I do not know whether 
9 :ir. Carlsen would wish to take an appeal, but it seems 
10 that, and particularly where one of the issues that we 
11 raised is an issue of Constitutional proportion, that some 
12 findings and—and conclusions be entered. We'd be glad to 
13 prepare those for the Court. 
14 l think I might need the Court's guidance a 
15 little bit in that, and I wonder if this might be an 
16 appropriate time for me just to ask several questions that 
17 I have in that regard. 
18 THE COURT; All right. And you're welcome to do 
19 that. It's perhaps my fault that the prosecutor isn't here 
20 and maybe the prosecution i3 entitled to some input at this 
21 point; but let me have you go ahead and state the questions 
22 that you have. I'll make notes on those, and see if we 
23 can address those even right here at this point. 
24 MR. HULT; Your Honor, I believe that with regards 
25 to the first issue that v e raised that the substantial rightd 
1 of the defendant were prejudiced by the amendments, both 
2 charging a State offense rather than a City offense and 
3 changing the party frort being the City of Logan to the 
4
 plaintiff being the State of Utah, that 4;ho Court finds 
5 that those do not substantially prejudice the rights of the 
6 defendant. 
7 THE COURT: Yes, I f ind t h a t the procedure we 
8 followed at the time of t r i a l did not substantially prejudice) 
9 defendant's r ights . 
10 Let me comment on that if I may. As I say, I had 
11 some question in my mind whether or not the prosecution 
12 needed to make—to move to amend to prosecute in the name of 
13 the State and took under advisement that motion. 
14 The pleadings, I think, at the time the jury was 
15 instructed did reflect the State of Utah. That was a 
16 tentative decision; what I mean is, we had to do one or the 
17 other. But that was not--the Court did not intend that to 
18 be reflective of a decision to grant the prosecution's 
19 motion to amend. 
20 And as I indicated earlier, the Court has 
21 concluded that the appropriate thing to do here is both to 
22 deny Logan City's motion to amend to prosecute in the State 
23 of Utah and to deny defendant's motion to dismiss. And 
24 perhaps our discussion here ought to address the questions 
25 that the defense has in light of those two decisions. 
1
 In other word*, I didn't think—I felt somewhat 
2
 cure that the—that the prosecution needed to amend; never-
3
 tneless, we went ahead and in the event that notion was 
4
 granted, the pleadings were denominated in the State of 
5
 Utah, but the Court by this decision denying Logan*s motion 
6
 to amend really makes it appropriate that the pleadings 
7
 should have remained in Logan City's name, but I don't 
8 think defendant's been prejudiced by that—that change to 
9
 the State of Utah, and in effect, it was—as I say, you had 
10 to do one or the other, and I really hadn't made a decision 
11 on that motion. So, the clerk was simply instructed to go 
12 ahead and put them in the State of Utah. 
13 MR. HOLT; The State had two motions. The first 
14 Leing amending the charge changing it from the City 
15 ordinance to a charge under the State statute, although the 
16 charging language remained the same, except that it was 
17
 changed from a Class B misdemeanor, or the amendment was to 
18
 amend from a Class 3 misdemeanor to a Class C. !?as that 
19 motion granted to that limited extent? 
20 THE COURT: No. 
21 MR. HULT: Okay. 
22 THE COURT; I think—I think that the City's 
23 motion to amend was unnecessary and for that reason, and 
24 of course, you called to the attention of the Court and 
25 Logan City's counsel that the State amendment had made the 
1
 same offense a Class C misdemeanor, and Ifn very much 
2
 aware of that* 
3
 Mr, *Iult, rny reading of the Allgood case indicates 
4
 and I think in your memorandum you corrnctly stated this, 
5
 I at the time of trial, it was not correctly stated. My notes 
6
 reflect that the argument was that the ordinance is void* 
7
 And then in your memorandum, I think you nore accurately 
8
 stated that it's the penalty of the ordinance that's void 
9
 under the Allgood decision* 
10 And that is consistent with other cases the Court 
11 has looked at, back in—in February and March, and I could 
12 cite some of those to you, if it would be of help. Let me 
13 see if I can find this research note here* 
14 For example, in State against Lancaster, a Utah 
15 case decided in 1383, at 765 P*2d 872, the defendant there 
16 I was charged with aggravated assault by a prisoner. The 
wrong statute was cited. It was corrected by interlineation 
The appellate court, in this case, the Utah 
Supreme Court, held that the charge, both before and after 
20
 the amendment was the same, it was aggravated assault by a 
21 prisoner; that only the statutory reference was changed, 
22
 the text of the Information was not altered and there was 
23 no prejudice to defendant in that case in preparation for 
2
* trial, as evidenced by the trial record* 
25





























actually reduced tne severity of the charge, which of 
course, wasn't necessarily favorable, as I recall, to the 
defendant, but it didn* t prejudice nim. 
In—chare's another case, ctate. against Colston, 
C-o-l-s~t~o-n, it's a Utah decision in 1364, at 396 P.2d 
405. In that case, the defendant was charged with having 
an overweight truck on the road. 
lie was convicted in the Price City Court, it was 
affirmed in the District Court; but at the District Court 
.level, the Court amended the statute to refer to a different 
statute that was not before the Court in the City Court in 
Price. 
It happened that the statute the District Court 
used still was not the correct statute or correct section. 
The appellate court heldf again thn Utah Supreme Court 
held that, citing earlier decisions, *:hat a nisnaiiung of 
the statute would not void the Information where there is a 
sufficient detailing of facts that constitute the offense 
in the body of the Information, so that the defendant is 
fully apprised of the nature of the charge against him. 
The Court cited cases there, and I've looked at 
cases from other states. There1s a case, Richfield City 
against Walker that I think is pertinent, that's a Utah 
Court of Appeals decision in 1990. The citation is 790 
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purview of the State laws, and I think naybe there's no 
dispute about that. 
Certainly in Code Section 75-10-104, the State 
statute makes this a Class C misdemeanor. But the Court's 
conclusion from considering all of these decisions and what 
occurred at the trial court level during the trial, con-
cludes that if the Court sentences Mr. Carlsen within the 
parameters of the Class C statute, that he is not prejudiced 
And that's what I intend to *o at this tine, and no I 
believe that the fact that it lenoiainated a Class P 
misdemeanor i3 not prejudicial to defendant. 
Nov;, that's probably the long answer to your 
question and maybe you have some more, but— 
MR. HULT; Your Honor, I believe in light of 
denying the City's motion to amend, then that the second 
and third issues that we had raised become irrelevant or 
beside the point. Those issues were raised on the basis of 
the amendments that had been requested by the City. 
1 THE COURT; Yes. I th ink t h a t * 3 probably c o r r e c t 
2 procedurally. 
3 MR. HULT: The only other issue that we have 
4 then that we want to address before th3 Court proceeds with 
5 sentencing is—and here again, I should say we appreciate 
6 the Court1s care and concern with the issues that we have 
7 raised, 
8 We don't specifically recall waiving the right to 
9 be sentenced within 30 days, and—and believe that without 
10 having waived that right to sentence within 30 days, that 
11 the Court should consider dismissing the charge against 
12 Mr. Carlsen rather than proceeding with sentence. 
13 T H S COURT; I can't specifically rexnenber, but I 
14 thought that at the time we set the sentencing originally 
15 for March 30th that we discussed that delay and I thought 
16 that the defense agreed to that. 
17 MR. HOLT: I don't have a specific nenory on 
18 that, your Honor. I — 
19 THE COURT: Let me sec if ny notes show anything. 
20 MR. HULT; Mr. Carlsen, this morning when he came 
21 to Court, said that he couldn't remember it, and therefore--
22 therefore, we're raising that question* 
23 THE COURT; We can go eff the record for just a 
24 moment • 
25 (Off the record.) 
4 
1 THE COURT; ::r. Iluic, I've looked at :iy notes, and 
2 I can't see anything one way or the other here, but it kinda 
3 J rings a bell in :vy aind that we did talk about that, because 
I think we set the Ilarch 30th date for -jntencing at the 
5 I tirae of the trial, at the conclusion; and of course, that 
6 would have keen beyond the 30 -lays at that time. 
7 But in any event, ny suggestion is that I listen 
8 to the tapee or ask one of the clerks to listen to the 
9 tapes and we'll find out what was done at that tine, and 
10 that we proceed with sentencing this norning, suiject to 
11 your motion, which I'll take under advisement. And if it 
12 looks like it's a well-taken notion, then I'll vacate that 
13 sentencing and grant the notion. 
14 !1R. HULT; Okay. We would appreciate that. 
15 THE COURT; Dut that would save everybody a 
16 trip back, and I think maybe that's the best way to do that. 
17 I night observe parenthetically that the 
18 Constitutional issues that you've raised and your memorandum 
19 sent to the Court, I think some tine after, or about the 
20 tine of the earlier sentencing date, were, I thought, 
21 pertinent, but they—those same issues were not raised at 
22 the time of trial. 
23 And I don't mean to belabor that point. Even so, 
24 the Court did have the motion at that time under advisement 




 as I state" her a a ^ w minutes ago. 
2
 J Is there anything that you or Mr. Carlsen would 
like to tell the Court further relative, more directly to 
t;Le facts of the offense or the off one*- Itself, before 
5
 I jentence is imposed? 
6
 MR. HULT: Just—just a few things, your Honor, 
7
 and Ifm not sure if the Court would feel that they're 
8 J exactly approposz but Mr. Carlsen called ne some tine ago 
and—to let me know that this kid that the police had used 
10 I and we felt that it was in the nature of entrapment, 
11 regularly sits at a local restaurant here called Angle*s 
12 with older friends of his, smokes cigarettes, pals around 
13 with them, and—and appears ~o he one of an older set of 
14 kids. 
15 i*n& he really felt that he was taken advantage 
16 of by the appearance of the—of the voy on this occasion, 
17 I :.nd ho does want the Court to >now that he has novor had 
any prior convictions, either for this particular offense, 
nor for any criminal offenses of any nature. 
20 I T H E COURT: All right. Thank you* 
21 Mr. Carlsen, you1re entitled under the statute to 
22 add anything you would like to what Mr. Ilult has told the 
23 Court. You1 re not required to, of course, and you have an 
24 able spokesman and an articulate spokesman in your lawyer. 





 ;iR. CARL 2 mi: Nothing other than what he said, 
2 that I did really think the toy was plenty of age, you 
3 know, when 1 sold those cijarettes. I didn't lo it to try 
4
 to sell to a rainor. I've always avo: I^ d trying to sell to 
5 rainors. 
6 THE COURT; All right. I appreciate that-
7 MR. CARLCCN; That's all I have to say. 
8 THE COURT: Mr, Carlson, the Court sentences you 
9 then on the offence of selling tobacco to a ninor to pay a 
10 $300 fine and serve 30 days in the jail at Logan, but 
11 places you on 12 months informal probation—well, I'll make 
12 it six months infernal probation to the Court. And suspends 
13 a hundred dollars of your fine ami suspends all of the jail 
14 time, if you complete the probation satisfactorily, the 
15 conditions of which are that you pay the fine balance, and 
16 that includes the State assessnent, I'm not adding it 
17 separately, of 0200, that you te a law-abiding person in 
18 general, minor traffic charges lon't count against that, 
19 but other Federal and State and local laws would. 
20 And specifically that you don't sell tobacco to 
21 underage people as a specific condition of probation, and 
22 those are all of the conditions of probation and sentence. 
23 Now, I don't know, !Ir. Ilult, whether we need to 
24 talk about his ability to pay that or the convenience of 
25 paying it or whether he needs an extension, or whether we 
12 
1
 should l i s t e n to zhz tape f i r s t and i n t e r l i n e whether he 
2
 waived, a t the time of the t r i a l , t he 30-^ay p r o v i s i o n . 
3
 What i s your p r e f e r e n c e about t h a t ? 
4
 Ma. CAELCISJ: I t d o e s n ' t m a t t e r to me. I h a v e n ' t 
5 got a checkbook now, bu t I could pay i t . 
6
 THE COURT: Well , i f you pay i t , I 1 1 1 ask the 
7
 c l e r k to held i t i n t r u s t , and then we111 apply i t t o a 
8 sen tence i f the m o t i o n ' s den i ed . If the m o t i o n ' s g r a n t e d , 
9
 i t 1 1 1 be r e t u r n e d to you. I s t h a t okay? 
10 MR. C7JXCEK: T h a t ' s f i n e . 
11 TEL COURT; A l l r i g h t . And v e - -
12 MR. CATLSTA1: I ' l l have to r e t my checkbook be fo re 
13 i could pay i t . 
14 THE COURT; Sure . W e ' l l g r an t you, w h a t ' s today? 
15 Tuesday? You could have i t done by tomorrow af te rnoon? 
16 HR. CABL32N: Oh, y e s . 
17 J T H E COURT; Grant you until 1.00 ?.n. then 
tomorrow to pay that int^ the clerk and— 
19 I MH. GVRL3EII: Just pay that flown here? 
20 T H E COURT: Yes. At the clerk's counter there in 
21 the foyer, and—thank you. 
22 I'm not sure the best way to do that. It may be 
23 that I'd have time to listen to that tape if the clerk can 
24 I provide facilities before I 90 back to Layton, because I 
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get hold of 
MR. HULT: 
I1* 
• * • 
Oh, 
Too 
vG CijL C u . 
going down to Layton in fact 
bad we can1 
Yes. 2ut let 
the 
t share rides. 
me try to 
tape and listen to it. 
It should be at the very 
do that 





THE COUHT: We'll go to the end, hack it up and 
see what happened in that colloquy there, and then I can 
make a decision and notify you and the prosecutor. All 
right. 
MR. UULT; v?e appreciate that. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much. 
(Whereupon, this sentencing was concluded.) 
* * * 
JL4_ 
